Debt Constraints and Employment: Not-for-Publication Appendix*

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A Proofs of Equivalence Results

We first consider the economy with housing and then the economy with liquid assets.

A.1 An Economy with Housing

In the economy with housing, families own houses and a family’s borrowing is subject to collateral constraints based on the value of their houses. The preferences of the family are

\[
\max_{c_t} \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t [u(c_t) + \psi_t v(h_t)],
\]

where \(c_t\) is the consumption of any of its members and \(h_t\) is the amount of housing consumed. The family faces a budget constraint,

\[
c_t + qa_{t+1} + p_t h_{t+1} = y_t + d_t + a_t + p_t h_t.
\]

At the beginning of period \(t\), the household owns a house of size \(h_t\) with value \(p_t h_t\) and decides whether to adjust the size of the house to \(h_{t+1}\). The family faces a collateral constraint that limits the maximum amount it can borrow to a fraction \(\tilde{\chi}\) of the value of the family’s home:

\[
a_{t+1} \geq -\tilde{\chi} p_t h_{t+1},
\]

where \(\tilde{\chi}\) is the maximum loan-to-value ratio.

There is a fixed supply of houses, normalized to 1, and each unit of a house delivers one unit of housing services each period. The housing stock does not depreciate. The parameter \(\psi_t\) in the utility function governs the relative preference for housing. This parameter varies over time and is the source of changes in house prices and thus, through the collateral constraint, the amount of debt the family can borrow.

Now, given an exogenous sequence of taste parameters \(\{\psi_t\}\) and a world bond price \(q\), let \(\{Q_t\}\) defined by \(Q_t = \beta^t u'(c_t)/u'(c_0)\) be the resulting sequence of shadow prices of the family. Given these shadow prices, the labor market side of the model is identical to that above. That is, the value functions for consumers and firms, the matching and bargaining, and the free entry conditions are all identical. Essentially, the only ingredient needed from the family problem to solve the rest of the model is the sequence of shadow prices \(\{Q_t\}\).

We claim that in terms of consumption, wages, and labor market outcomes, the debt constraint economy is equivalent to the economy with housing. We first show that given a debt constraint economy with a sequence of borrowing limits \(\{\chi_t\}\), we can construct a sequence of taste parameters \(\{\psi_t\}\) for the economy with housing such that, except for the price and quantity of housing, allocations and prices in the two equilibria coincide. We then show that given an economy with housing with taste parameters \(\{\psi_t\}\), we can construct a sequence of borrowing limits \(\{\chi_t\}\) such that, except for the price and quantity of housing, allocations and prices in the two equilibria coincide.

Let us start with a debt constraint economy with a budget constraint,

\[
c_t + qa_{t+1} = y_t + d_t + a_t.
\]

Note that the solution to the family problem can be summarized by the first-order conditions

\[
qQ_t = Q_{t+1} + \theta_t
\]
\( \theta_t (a_{t+1} + \chi_t) = 0, \quad (4) \)

the budget constraint and the debt constraint, where \( \theta_t \) is the multiplier on the debt constraint. In the economy with housing, the solution to the family problem evaluated at the equilibrium value of \( h_t = 1 \) is summarized by the first-order conditions

\[ qQ_t = Q_{t+1} + \theta_t, \quad (5) \]

\[ \theta_t (a_{t+1} + \bar{\chi}p_t) = 0, \quad (6) \]

and

\[ \beta \psi_{t+1} v'(1) + Q_{t+1}p_{t+1} + \theta_t \bar{\chi}p_t = Qtp_t, \quad (7) \]

and the budget constraint (2). Note first that with \( h_t = 1 \), the budget constraints in the two economies coincide. Next, note that given the allocations and multipliers from the debt constraint economy, if the price of houses is equal to \( p_t = \chi_t / \bar{\chi} \) and we set \( \psi_{t+1} \) according to

\[ \psi_{t+1} = \frac{1}{\beta v'(1)}(Qtp_t - Q_{t+1}p_{t+1} - \theta_t \bar{\chi}p_t), \]

then provided \( \{c_t, a_{t+1}, \theta_t\} \) satisfy (3) and (4), these same variables along with \( p_t \) and \( \psi_{t+1} \) satisfy (5)–(7) and the collateral constraint. For the rest of the construction, since \( \{c_t\} \) in the two economies coincide, so do the shadow prices \( \{Q_t\} \). As we have noted, the labor market variables are uniquely pinned down by these shadow prices. Hence, consumption, output, and all labor market variables coincide in the two economies.

For the converse, we start with an economy with housing with taste parameters \( \{\psi_t\} \) and construct a sequence of borrowing limits \( \{\chi_t\} \) such that, except for the price and quantity of housing, the two equilibria coincide. Here we simply set \( \chi_t = \bar{\chi}p_t \) and note that the budget constraints and first-order conditions for the two equilibria coincide. Thus, the shadow prices also coincide and, necessarily, so do consumption, output, and all labor market variables. We summarize this discussion with a proposition.

**Proposition 1.** The debt constraint economy is equivalent to the economy with housing in terms of consumption, labor allocations, and wages.

Note that in the economy with housing, we have time-varying taste parameters \( \{\psi_t\} \) but a constant maximal loan-to-value ratio \( \bar{\chi} \). It is immediate that a similar equivalence proposition holds if we consider a collateral constraint economy with a constant taste parameter \( \psi_t = \psi \) and time-varying maximal loan-to-value ratios \( \{\chi_t\} \).

### A.2 An Economy with Illiquid Assets

Here we consider an economy with illiquid assets and liquid borrowing. Each family can save in assets that have a relatively high rate of return but are illiquid and can borrow at a relatively low rate. The budget constraint is

\[ c_t + q_a a_{t+1} - q_b b_{t+1} = y_t + d_t + a_t - b_t - \phi(a_{t+1}, a_t), \quad (8) \]
where $a_{t+1}$ denotes assets and $b_{t+1}$ denotes debt. We assume that $q_a = 1/(1 + r_a) < q_b = 1/(1 + r_b)$, so the return on assets $1 + r_a$ is higher than the interest on debt. For simplicity, we assume that $eta = q_a$, which can be interpreted as assuming that the family’s patience is equal to that of the consumers in the rest of the world. We can think of the cost of borrowing as being $1 + r_b = 1 + r_a(1 - \tau)$, where $\tau$ is the income tax rate. Under this interpretation, the before-tax interest rate on saving equals the before-tax interest rate on borrowing, but the interest paid on borrowing is tax deductible. The function $\phi(a_{t+1}, a_t)$ represents the cost of adjusting assets from $a_t$ to $a_{t+1}$ and captures the idea that assets are illiquid. Borrowing is subject to the debt constraint

$$b_{t+1} \leq \bar{\chi}_t,$$

where $\{\bar{\chi}_t\}$ is a sequence of exogenous borrowing limits. The consumption problem of the family is to choose $\{c_t, a_{t+1}, b_{t+1}\}$ to solve

$$\max_{c_t, a_{t+1}, b_{t+1}} \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t u(c_t)$$

subject to the budget constraint (8) and the debt constraint (9). The first-order conditions for assets and debt imply

$$c_t + q_a a_{t+1} - q_b b_{t+1} = y_t + a_t - b_t - \phi(a_{t+1}, a_t) + d_t,$$

$$Q_t [q_a + \phi_1(a_{t+1}, a_t)] = Q_{t+1} [1 - \phi_2(a_{t+2}, a_{t+1})],$$

$$Q_t q_b = Q_{t+1} + \theta_t,$$

and

$$\theta_t (\bar{\chi}_t - b_{t+1}) = 0,$$

where $\theta_t$ is the multiplier on the debt constraint.

Let $\{\hat{c}_t\}$ be the consumption allocations in the economy with debt constraints and $\{\hat{Q}_t\}$ be the associated shadow prices. We assume that the interest rate on borrowing is sufficiently low in the illiquid asset economy, so that the following inequality holds at the given allocations in the debt constraint economy:

$$q_b = \frac{1}{1 + r_b} > \frac{\hat{Q}_{t+1}}{\hat{Q}_t}.$$

We then have the following result.

**Proposition 2.** Under (14), the debt constraint economy is equivalent to the economy with illiquid assets in terms of consumption, labor allocations, and wages.

More precisely, given an allocation in the debt constraint economy that satisfies (14), there is a sequence of debt limits $\{\bar{\chi}_t\}$ in the illiquid asset economy such that the consumption and marginal utilities in the illiquid asset economy coincide with the consumption and marginal utilities in the debt constraint economy. Hence, the labor market allocations and prices coincide as well.

The proof is constructive. We start with the allocations in the debt constraint economy, in particular, the consumption, wage income, and profit income denoted $\hat{c}_t$, $\hat{y}_t$, and $\hat{d}_t$, and use them to construct candidate allocations denoted by $\tilde{c}_t$, $\tilde{y}_t$, $\tilde{d}_t$, and so on for the illiquid asset economy. We next show that we can choose the debt limits $\{\bar{\chi}_t\}$ in the illiquid asset economy so that the consumption and labor market outcomes in both economies coincide.
Formally, let $\tilde{c}_t = \tilde{d}_t$. The first-order condition for assets (11), the associated shadow prices $\tilde{Q}_t$ from the debt constraint economy, together with the transversality condition and an initial condition for assets $a_0$, imply a candidate path for assets $\{\tilde{a}_{t+1}\}$ for the illiquid asset economy. Given that the shadow prices in the two economies coincide, so do the wage income and net profits of firms, so that $\tilde{y}_t = \tilde{y}_t$ and $\tilde{d}_t = \tilde{d}_t$. To construct the debt limits $\{\tilde{\chi}_t\}$ in the illiquid asset economy, use that under (14) the debt constraints in the illiquid asset economy bind, so that $\tilde{b}_{t+1} = \chi_t$. Subtracting the budget constraints in the two economies gives

$$q_a\tilde{a}_{t+1} + \phi(\tilde{a}_{t+1}, \tilde{a}_t) + \tilde{\chi}_{t-1} - q_b\tilde{\chi}_t = \tilde{\chi}_{t-1} - q\tilde{\chi}_t$$

for $t \geq 1$ \hspace{1cm} (15)

and

$$q_a\tilde{a}_1 + \phi(\tilde{a}_1, \tilde{a}_0) + \tilde{b}_0 - \tilde{a}_0 - q_b\tilde{\chi}_0 = -\tilde{a}_0 - q\tilde{\chi}_0$$

for $t = 0$. \hspace{1cm} (16)

Clearly, given some initial assets $\tilde{a}_0$ in the illiquid asset economy, the associated $\tilde{a}_1$ as well as the initial assets $\tilde{a}_0$ and debt limit $\tilde{\chi}_0$ from the debt constraint economy, we can choose initial debt $\tilde{b}_0$ and debt limit $\tilde{\chi}_0$ to satisfy (16). (Note there exists one degree of indeterminacy in $\tilde{b}_0$ and $\tilde{\chi}_0$.) Then for $t = 1$, we choose $\tilde{\chi}_1$ to satisfy (15) and proceed recursively, choosing $\tilde{\chi}_t$ to satisfy the budget constraint in each period $t$. Thus, the allocations in the two economies coincide. The proof of the converse is similar.

**B Computing the Benefit Flows from a Match**

Here we describe how we decompose the surplus from a match, $S_t$, into period-by-period flows, $s_t$, that we then use to calculate the Macaulay duration.

The surplus from a match is equal to the present value of what a firm and a worker jointly earn,

$$E(z, h) = W(z, h) + J(z, h),$$

net of what the nonemployed earn, $U(z)$, where we focus on steady states and therefore drop the $t$ subscript. The present value of what a firm and a worker jointly earn from forming a match is

$$E(z, h) = zh + \beta\phi \left[ (1 - \sigma) \int_{z' \geq \tilde{z}(h')} E(z', h') dF_e(z'|z) + (1 - \sigma) \int_{z' < \tilde{z}(h')} U(z') dF_e(z'|z) \right]$$

$$+ \sigma \int U(z') dF_e(z'|z),$$

where $\tilde{z}(h')$ is the exit cutoff. The present value of what the nonemployed earn is

$$U(z) = b(z) + \beta\phi \left\{ \lambda^w(z) \int_{z' \geq \tilde{z}(1)} W(z', 1) dF_u(z'|z) + \lambda^w(z) \int_{z' < \tilde{z}(1)} U(z') dF_u(z'|z) \right\} + [1 - \lambda^w(z)] \int U(z') dF_u(z'|z).$$

Notice that $U(z)$ depends on $W(z, h)$ and that Nash bargaining implies that $W(z, h)$ is a weighted average of $E(z, h)$ and $U(z)$,

$$W(z, h) = \gamma E(z, h) + (1 - \gamma)U(z).$$
We can thus write the value of an unmatched consumer as

\[
U(z) = b(z) + \beta \phi \left[ \gamma \lambda^w(z) \int_{z' \geq \bar{z}(1)} E(z', 1) dF_u(z'|z) + (1 - \gamma) \lambda^w(z) \int_{z' \geq \bar{z}(1)} U(z') dF_u(z'|z) \right] \\
+ \beta \phi \left\{ \lambda^w(z) \int_{z' < \bar{z}(1)} U(z') dF_u(z'|z) + [1 - \lambda^w(z)] \int U(z') dF_u(z'|z) \right\}.
\]

We use these expressions to decompose the total surplus from a match into flows that accrue at different dates. Consider a consumer with general human capital \(z\) who is matched with a firm and thus starts producing with human capital \((z, 1)\) and another consumer who is not matched initially. As these expressions show, the surplus from the match is given by the expected value of what the employed consumer produces starting from today, relative to what the nonemployed consumer will produce, taking into account that each of these consumers may switch from employment to nonemployment and vice versa, may die, and experience changes in human capital according to transition probabilities that depend on the consumer’s employment status. Importantly, the effective probability that a nonemployed consumer transits into employment is given by \(\gamma \lambda^w\), not \(\gamma\), which reflects the surplus sharing rule embedded in the Nash bargaining protocol.

We can think intuitively about what we do by considering simulating two large groups of consumers, all with some identical general human capital \(z_0\), one group starting employed with human capital \((z_0, 1)\) and another group starting nonemployed with general human capital \(z_0\). Then, we can simulate over time how these consumers’ human capital evolves according to their respective laws of motion and how consumers switch employment status—with probability \(\sigma\) for employed and \(\gamma \lambda^w\) for the nonemployed. The flows we calculate are the difference, at each date, of the total output produced by those in the first group and that produced by those in the second group.

C  Data

We use state-level information on consumption, house prices, employment, wages, total population, and working-age population between 2007 and 2009 on all continental U.S. states, that is, all states of the United States except for Alaska and Hawaii.

Consumption. We measure consumption of nondurable goods (food and beverages purchased for off-premises consumption, clothing and footwear, gasoline and other energy goods, and other nondurable goods) and services (transportation services, recreation services, food services and accommodations, financial services and insurance, and other services) using state-level information on personal consumption expenditures from the BEA Regional Economic Accounts Data. Specifically, we use data from the BEA archive “Personal Consumption Expenditures (PCE) by State” in the file PCEbyState.xlsx, available at http://www.bea.gov/regional/downloadzip.cfm. The BEA provides annual information on state-level consumption for the 50 states of the United States and the District of Columbia from 1997 to 2014 in millions of U.S. dollars of the corresponding year. We use data for the period 1997-2012, but similar results can be obtained by using the more recent data. We obtain a measure of consumption per capita using census information on the size of the state population, described below. We deflate this measure by the national CPI.
House Prices. We construct a measure of state-level house prices using the state-level Zillow Home Value Index (ZHVI) for “All Homes.” (See Zillow’s website for a description of the methodology used by Zillow to compute this index.) In particular, we use ZHVI in the version “All Homes (SFR, Condo/Co-op) Time Series ($).” This monthly house price index is available for 48 U.S. states between January 2006 and December 2012. However, three states—Kansas, Maine, and Texas—are missing throughout the period, and only 41 U.S. states are consistently sampled over this period. In particular, 7 states—New York, Iowa, West Virginia, Montana, North Dakota, Vermont, and Wyoming—are missing in 2006 at the onset of the recession. We obtain an annual measure of house prices by averaging this monthly house price index for each of the 41 states that are consistently in the sample over the 12 months of each year of interest. We deflate this measure by the national CPI.

Employment. We use information on state-level total nonfarm employment, excluding government and construction, from the “Local Area Personal Income Accounts” archive of the BEA Regional Economic Accounts Data on the total number of individuals employed full-time and part-time by state and year, made available by the BEA as “CA25N: Total Full-Time and Part-Time Employment by NAICS Industry.” We classify nontradable and tradable employment as follows. We consider tradable employment as employment in:
   i) forestry, fishing, and related activities, namely forestry and logging (1131-1133), fishing, hunting, and trapping (114), and support activities for agriculture and forestry (115). We exclude from this category crop production (111) and animal production (112);
   ii) mining (21);
   iii) manufacturing (31-33).

   We consider nontradable employment as employment in the remaining industries in total non-farm employment excluding government and construction, namely:
   i) utilities (22);
   ii) wholesale trade (42);
   iii) retail trade (44-45);
   iv) transportation and warehousing (48-49);
   v) information (51);
   vi) finance and insurance (52);
   vii) real estate and rental and leasing (53);
   viii) professional, scientific, and technical services (54);
   ix) management of companies and enterprises (55);
   x) administrative and support and waste management and remediation services (56);
   xi) educational services (61);
   xii) health care and social assistance (62);
   xiii) arts, entertainment, and recreation (71);
   xiv) accommodation and food services (72);
   xv) other services, except public administration (81).

Wages. We compute nominal hourly wages following Beraja, Hurst, and Ospina (2016) based on information on total labor income, hours, and weeks worked available from the census Integrated Public Use Microdata Series (IPUMS). Like Beraja, Hurst, and Ospina (2016), we focus on working-age males from non-group-quarter households who are employed full-time, work at least 30 hours
per week and 48 weeks during the previous 12 months, and whose labor income is above $5,000. We calculate hourly wages by dividing total labor income during the year—the sum of nominal wages, salary earnings, and business non-farm earnings during the prior 12 months—by hours worked. We obtain a measure of hours worked in a year by multiplying hours usually worked per week by the number of weeks worked in the year.

Following Beraja, Hurst, and Ospina (2016), we adjust this measure of nominal hourly wages for the differential demographical composition of different U.S. states. To derive such a measure of adjusted nominal hourly wages, we first run the following OLS regression in each year:

$$\log w_{itk} = \gamma_t + \Gamma_t X_{itk} + \eta_{itk},$$

where $w_{itk}$ is the hourly wage for household/individual $i$ in period $t$ residing in state $k$; $X_{itk}$ is a vector of controls for demographic variables, which include dummy variables for usual hours worked, age, education, citizenship, and race. We next compute adjusted nominal wages within a state as the average of $e^{\gamma_t + \eta_{itk}}$ across all individuals in state $k$. Following this procedure, we replicate the adjusted nominal hourly wages constructed by Beraja, Hurst, and Ospina (2016). We deflate this measure by the national CPI to obtain a measure of adjusted real hourly wages.

**Total and Working-Age Population.** Estimates of total and working-age population are available at [http://www.census.gov/popest/data/intercensal/state/state2010.html](http://www.census.gov/popest/data/intercensal/state/state2010.html) for each U.S. state. We use estimates of state-level total and working-age population from the “Inter-censal Estimates of the Resident Population by Five-Year Age Groups, Sex, Race and Hispanic Origin for States and the United States: April 1, 2000 to July 1, 2010” from the data file ST-EST00INT-ALLDATA.csv. In measuring working-age population, we restrict attention to individuals between 15 and 64 years of age (included), who correspond to individuals between age group 4, that is, individuals aged 15 to 19 years, and age group 13, that is, individuals aged 60 to 64 years. (See the documentation contained in ST-EST00INT-ALLDATA.pdf, available from the census.)

**D Main Variables and Statistics**

**D.1 Measures of Annual Consumption Changes**

One of our model’s main predictions concerns the relationship between changes in state-level consumption and employment between 2007 and 2009. We isolate the component of consumption changes due to credit constraints by projecting consumption changes on house price changes following the approach of Beraja, Hurst, and Ospina (2016). We then analyze the economy’s response to the associated changes in consumption.

Formally, we compute annual changes in consumption in each U.S. state relative to 2006 based on the growth rate of consumption between 2007 and 2009 predicted by changes in house prices in those years. To do so, we first regress log consumption growth on log house price growth between 2006 and 2007 to obtain the growth rate of predicted consumption between 2006 and 2007, $g_{67}$. We repeat this exercise for the periods between 2007 and 2008 and between 2008 and 2009 to obtain, respectively, the growth rate of predicted consumption between 2007 and 2008, $g_{78}$, and the growth

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1We thank these authors, in particular Erik Hurst, for generously helping us to replicate their construction.
rate of predicted consumption between 2008 and 2009, \( g_{89} \). We then normalize consumption in 2006 to be equal to zero for all states and calculate annual consumption in each subsequent year for each state as

\[
c_{2007,s} = c_{2006,s} + g_{67}, \quad c_{2008,s} = c_{2007,s} + g_{78}, \quad c_{2009,s} = c_{2008,s} + g_{89},
\]

with 2006 as baseline year. We then linearly interpolate these data to construct a quarterly series of consumption for each state.

### D.2 Cross-Sectional Wage Growth

In our main quantification exercise, we use moments of the cross-sectional distribution of earnings from U.S. census data for 1970, 1980, and 1990 for high school graduates (individuals with 12 years of education) following Elsby and Shapiro (2012). We also use an alternative measure of life-cycle wage growth for this group of workers based on the findings of Rubinstein and Weiss (2006).

**Elsby and Shapiro (2012).** We closely follow Elsby and Shapiro (2012), ES hereafter, and measure earnings as the annual wage and salary income of census respondents, and experience as potential experience, that is, an individual’s age minus years of education minus six. We focus on full-time, full-year workers, defined as individuals who work 35 hours or more per week and are employed for 50 or more weeks per year. Like ES, we apply these selection rules so as to minimize the risk of sampling respondents who have not left full-time education, to make it more likely that observed profiles reflect variation in wages rather than in hours or weeks worked, and to minimize the risk of discrepancies between actual and potential experience.

ES calculate experience-earnings profiles in any given year using normalized log earnings, which are computed as the difference between the average log nominal wage of individuals in the given year with a given level of experience and the average log nominal wage of individuals in the same year with zero years of experience. We target the difference in average log wages between workers with 30 years of experience and workers just entering the labor market, averaged across the three years 1970, 1980, and 1990, which is equal to 1.21 or, equivalently, 4.1% per year of experience.

As we discuss in the paper, estimates from Buchinsky et al. (2010) from the PSID imply an average annual growth rate of wages over an employment spell of 7% for workers who have between 1 and 40 years of experience. To see that the different growth rates of wages implied by cross-sectional and longitudinal experience-earnings profiles are broadly consistent with each other, we also calculate experience-earnings profiles using (weighted) PSID data from 1975, 1981, and 1991 applying the same sample selection rules of ES. This choice of years reflects the fact that no individual with 12 years of education is observed with zero or one year of experience between 1970 and 1974, and that the PSID is a retrospective panel, so years 1981 and 1991, respectively, refer to labor income in 1980 and 1990. As Figure 1 reveals, the experience-earnings profiles computed based on PSID data are remarkably similar to those computed based on census data.

**Rubinstein and Weiss (2006).** In our robustness exercises in the paper, we show that our model’s implications for the labor market responses to a credit tightening are robust to using alternative evidence from Rubinstein and Weiss (2006) on how wages grow over the life cycle. Figure 3a in Rubinstein and Weiss (2006), on which, as discussed in the paper, our alternative calibration is based, plots cohort and cross-sectional wage profiles for white male high school
graduates over the period 1964-2002 from the March supplements of the CPS. The figure shows the experience-wage profiles for the cohort of high school graduates born between 1951 and 1955, who entered the labor market between 1971 and 1975. The graph also reports the evolution of cross-sectional experience-wage profiles from 1971 to 2000 in five-year intervals, where each such cross-sectional profile depicts the mean wages of workers with the indicated experience in a given time interval.

As Rubinstein and Weiss remark, it is apparent from the figure that cohort-based wage profiles are affected by changes in market conditions that shift the cross-sectional profiles over time. For instance, high school graduates of all experience levels earned lower wages during the period between 1970 and 2000, which is why the mean wage profile of the cohort of high school graduates born between 1951 and 1955 exhibits almost no wage growth after 10 years in the labor market.

D.3 On-the-Job Wage Growth

To pin down the parameters of the processes for general and firm-specific human capital, we target statistics on the longitudinal growth of individual wages implied by three distinct sets of estimates from well-known studies of returns to tenure and experience: Altonji and Shakotko (1987), Topel (1991), and Buchinsky et al. (2010). The relative size of these returns has long been debated in the labor economics literature. We take estimates from these three influential studies as representative of the spectrum of returns documented in the literature. Here we describe how the estimates of returns to tenure and experience from these papers informed our calibration.

As we explain in the paper, for a given parameterization of our model, we simulate paths for wages, experience, and tenure for a panel of individuals. Given the simulated experience and tenure profiles from our model, we compute the annualized wage growth implied by the estimated wage equations in Altonji and Shakotko (1987), Topel (1991), and Buchinsky et al. (2010). We then choose the parameters of the human capital processes in our model to ensure that our model’s implied wage growth at various levels of experience is consistent with the wage growth implied by the wage equations in these three studies. We next provide details about the wage equations in these studies and the estimates from them that we used.

Altonji and Shakotko (1987). We use the estimates of the effects of education, experience, and tenure on log wages by Altonji and Shakotko (1987) from a PSID sample of white males observed between 1968 and 1981. These authors estimate the log wage equation given by

$$W_{ijt} = b_0Z_{ijt} + b_1T_{ijt} + b_2T_{ijt}^2 + b_3OLDJOB_{ijt} + \varepsilon_{ijt},$$

by instrumental variables (IV), where $W_{ijt}$ is the log real wage of individual $i$ in job $j$ at time $t$, computed as the log of labor earnings during the year divided by the product of annual hours and the GNP implicit price deflator for consumption, $Z_{ijt} = (Edu,Edu^2,Time,X_{ijt},X_{ijt}^2/10,X_{ijt}^3/100,-Edu \times X_{ijt})$ is a vector of characteristics of the individual such as education ($Edu$) and of the job including labor market experience ($X_{ijt}$), $T_{ijt}$ and $T_{ijt}^2$ are the number and the square of the number of years individual $i$ has held job $j$ as of time $t$, and OLDJOB$_{ijt}$ is equal to one if $T_{ijt} > 1$ and to zero otherwise. This latter variable allows the impact of the first year of tenure on wages to be more flexible than implied by the quadratic specification of the impact of tenure on wages. The variable $\varepsilon_{ijt}$ is the error term, which consists of the sum of a fixed individual effect, $\varepsilon_i$, a fixed job match effect, $\varepsilon_{ij}$, and a transitory component, $\eta_{ijt}$. The principal instrumental variables the
authors use to address the likely correlation between the tenure variables and the error term are deviations of the tenure variables around their means for the sample observations on a given job spell.

The authors’ main finding is that the effect of seniority on wages is small once the effects of general labor market experience and secular wage growth, captured by a time trend, are taken into account. Their preferred estimates imply that 10 years of tenure lead to a wage increase of 6.6%, with much of this growth occurring in the first year on the job. The estimates of Altonji and Shakotko (1987) of the effects of education, experience, and tenure on wages are reported in Table 1, which replicates column IV of Table 1 in Altonji and Shakotko (1987) for the estimates of the effects of \( \text{Edu} \) and \( \text{Edu}^2 \) and the second row of the panel titled “Corrected’ IV Estimates” of Table IV in Altonji and Shakotko (1987) for the remaining estimates.

| Table 1: Estimates from Altonji and Shakotko (1987) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Edu | Edu^2 | X | X^2/10 | X^3/100 | Edu × X | T | T^2 |
| 0.0155 | 0.0019 | 0.0339 | -0.0111 | 0.00096 | 0.00045 | 0.0005 | 0.00012 | 0.0467 |

Topel (1991). We use the estimates of the effects of tenure and experience on annual within-job wage growth obtained by Topel (1991) from a PSID sample of white males observed between 1968 and 1983. These estimates are the outcome of the first step of a two-step procedure followed by Topel to separately estimate returns to tenure and experience. In the first step, Topel estimates parameters of within-job wage growth, whereas in the second step, the author provides an estimate of the effects of experience and, residually, of tenure obtaining a lower bound on the average return to tenure. The main finding of the paper is that 10 years of tenure raise the wage of the typical male worker in the United States by over 25%.

Formally, let \( y_{ijt} \) denote the log wage of individual \( i \) in job \( j \) at time \( t \), computed as the log average hourly earnings deflated by a wage index for white males calculated from the annual demographic (March) files of the CPS (see Murphy and Welch (1992)). Let \( X_{ijt} \) denote total labor market experience, \( T_{ijt} \) current job tenure, and \( \epsilon_{ijt} \) a mean-zero error.\(^2\) Topel (1991) estimates wage growth within a job as

\[
\Delta Y_{ijt} = \beta_{11} \Delta X_{ijt} + \beta_{21} \Delta T_{ijt} + \beta_{12} \Delta X_{ijt}^2 \times 10^2 + \beta_{22} \Delta T_{ijt}^2 \times 10^2 \\
+ \beta_{13} \Delta X_{ijt}^3 \times 10^3 + \beta_{23} \Delta T_{ijt}^3 \times 10^3 + \beta_{14} \Delta X_{ijt}^4 \times 10^4 + \beta_{24} \Delta T_{ijt}^4 \times 10^4 + \Delta \epsilon_{ijt},
\]

where \( \Delta Y_{ijt} = y_{ijt} - y_{ijt-1} \), the parameters \( \beta_{11} \) and \( \beta_{21} \) correspond to parameters \( \beta_1 \) and \( \beta_2 \), respectively, in Topel (1991), \( \epsilon_{ijt} \) is the sum of a worker-firm effect, \( \phi_{ijt} \), an individual-specific effect, \( \mu_i \), and a transitory component, \( \nu_{ijt} \), and \( Z_{ijt} \in \{X_{ijt}, T_{ijt}\} \), with

\[
\Delta Z_{ijt} = Z_{ijt} - Z_{ijt-1} = 1, \\
\Delta Z_{ijt}^2 = Z_{ijt}^2 - Z_{ijt-1}^2 = 2Z_{ijt} - 1, \\
\Delta Z_{ijt}^3 = Z_{ijt}^3 - Z_{ijt-1}^3 = 3Z_{ijt}(Z_{ijt} - 1) + 1, \\
\Delta Z_{ijt}^4 = Z_{ijt}^4 - Z_{ijt-1}^4 = (2Z_{ijt} - 1)[2Z_{ijt}(Z_{ijt} - 1) + 1].
\]

\(^2\)This index is meant to filter out both real aggregate wage growth and changes in any aggregate price level so that wage data from different time periods of the panel are expressed in comparable units. The GNP price deflator for consumption was used to construct it.
These expressions are obtained by repeatedly using the fact that $Z_{ijt-1} = Z_{ijt} - 1$. Topel’s estimates of the effects of experience and tenure are reported in Table 2, which replicates column 3 of Table 2 in Topel (1991).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>$\Delta X + \Delta T$</th>
<th>$\Delta X^2(\times 10^2)$</th>
<th>$\Delta X^3(\times 10^3)$</th>
<th>$\Delta T^2(\times 10^2)$</th>
<th>$\Delta T^3(\times 10^3)$</th>
<th>$\Delta T^4(\times 10^4)$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0.1258</td>
<td>-0.4067</td>
<td>0.0989</td>
<td>0.0089</td>
<td>-0.4592</td>
<td>0.1846</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Buchinsky et al. (2010).** Much of the literature on returns to tenure and experience has focused on the possible endogeneity of job changes and its effect on the estimation of returns to tenure. Buchinsky et al. (2010), BFKT hereafter, contribute to this debate by also considering the possible endogeneity of labor market experience and its impact on the estimation of both returns to tenure and experience. To address this issue, they explicitly model individuals’ decisions about employment as well as interfirm mobility. They use data from the PSID from 1975 to 1992 and restrict attention to all heads of households between the ages of 18 and 65 interviewed for at least three years during the sample period.

Using a Bayesian approach, these authors estimate their model for three separate education groups: high school dropouts, high school graduates, and college graduates. Although these authors’ estimated returns to experience are somewhat higher than those previously found in the literature, they are of similar magnitude. In contrast, these authors’ estimates of the returns to tenure are much higher than those previously found in the literature, including those obtained by Topel (1991). Consequently, BFKT’s estimates of total within-job wage growth are significantly higher than Topel’s estimates. These results hold true for all three of the education groups they analyze.

Their study sheds light on several important factors leading to the apparent differences between their estimates and those from previous studies. First, their study highlights the importance of explicitly modeling employment as well as mobility decisions, which directly affect experience and tenure. Second, their study underscores the importance of accounting for unobserved heterogeneity in participation and mobility decisions, in addition to accounting for unobserved heterogeneity in the wage function. Third, their study demonstrates the importance of explicitly controlling for job-specific components in the wage function. The authors control for these job-specific components by introducing into their wage equation a function that provides a summary statistic of an individual’s career path, as summarized by a worker’s tenure and experience in previous jobs. BFKT find that the magnitude of the estimated returns changes markedly when they account for this factor but that the qualitative results are similar.

Formally, BFKT specify the observed log wage equation for individual $i$ in job $j$ at time $t$ as

$$w_{ijt} = w_{ijt}^* I(y_{ijt} = 1),$$

(19)

where, by definition, $w_{ijt}^* = x_{wijt}' \delta_0 + \varepsilon_{ijt}$ and is measured in the data by the log of the (deflated) wage in year $t$, measured as total (real) labor income from the PSID. (When an individual does not work for the entire year, the authors compute earnings per week, multiply this wage figure by 52, and impute the resulting earnings as the individual’s earnings for the year.) Here $x_{wijt}'$ is a
vector of observed characteristics, including education, labor market experience, and firm tenure, of an individual in the current job $j$, and $I(\cdot)$ is an indicator function that equals one if, and only if, $y_{it} = 1$, that is, if, and only if, the $i$-th individual participates in the labor market at time $t$. Note that $w^*_ijt$ represents the individual’s offered wage, which is observed only if the individual chooses to work.

BFKT decompose the error term $\varepsilon_{ijt}$ into three components,

$$\varepsilon_{ijt} = J^W_{ijt} + \alpha_{wi} + \xi_{ijt},$$

where $\alpha_{wi}$ is a person-specific correlated random effect, analogous to $\mu_i$ in Topel (1991), and $\xi_{ijt}$ is an idiosyncratic error term. The term $J^W_{ijt}$ is analogous to the term $\phi_{ijt}$ in Topel (1991), with the important difference that in BFKT, it explicitly provides a summary statistic for the individual’s work history and career: $J^W_{ijt}$ captures the timing and magnitude of all discontinuous jumps in the individual’s wage profiles that resulted from all job changes experienced by the individual until date $t$. BFKT specify $J^W_{ijt}$ as a piecewise linear function of experience and tenure at the time of a job change and given by

$$J^W_{ijt} = (\phi^0 + \phi^0_0 e_{i0})d_{i1} + \sum_{k=1}^{4} \sum_{l=1}^{M_{it}} (\phi^k + \phi^k_k s_{itl-1} + \phi^k_k e_{itl-1})d_{klit},$$

where $d_{i1it} = 1$ if the $l$-th job of the $i$-th individual lasted less than a year and equals 0 otherwise, $d_{2it} = 1$ if the $l$-th job of the $i$-th individual lasted between 2 and 5 years and equals 0 otherwise, $d_{3it} = 1$ if the $l$-th job of the $i$-th individual lasted between 6 and 10 years and equals 0 otherwise, and $d_{4it} = 1$ if the $l$-th job of the $i$-th individual lasted more than 10 years and equals 0 otherwise; $M_{it}$ denotes the number of job changes experienced by the $i$-th individual at time $t$ (not including the individual’s first sample year). If an individual changed jobs in the first sample year, then $d_{i1} = 1$, otherwise $d_{i1} = 0$. The variables $s_{itl-1}$ and $e_{itl-1}$ denote tenure and experience in year $t_l$, respectively, when individual $i$ leaves job $l$. Note that while the $\phi$’s are fixed parameters, the size of the jumps within each of the four brackets of tenure may differ depending on the level of tenure and labor market experience at the time of a job change.

In Table 3 we report the estimates of BFKT of the effects of experience and tenure on wages for high school graduates, which replicates column 4 of Table 4 in their paper.

**D.4 Figure 11 in the Paper**

In Figure 11 in the paper, panels A through C, we plot changes in total employment, employment in the nontradable sector, and employment in the tradable sector against changes in consumption, as predicted by changes in house prices, across U.S. states between 2007 and 2009. As we explain in the paper, total employment in each state is computed as the weighted average of employment in the nontradable and tradable goods sectors. The relationship between changes in wages and changes in employment across U.S. states between 2007 and 2009 is depicted in panel D of Figure 11. In all panels, changes are normalized by those of Louisiana, which is the state that experienced the median change in consumption across states between 2007 and 2009.

The elasticities reported in panels A through C are computed following an IV approach in which in the first stage we regress changes in consumption to changes in house prices, weighted by the working-age population in each state. In the second stage, we regress changes in the relevant
Table 3: Estimates from Buchinsky et al. (2010)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Mean</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$X$</td>
<td>0.076</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$X^2/100$</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>$X^3/1000$</td>
<td>0.123</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$X^4/10,000$</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>$T$</td>
<td>0.069</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$T^2/100$</td>
<td>-0.285</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$T^3/1000$</td>
<td>0.077</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$T^4/10,000$</td>
<td>-0.007</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Job switches after:
- Up to 1 year ($\phi_{10}$) 0.109
- 2 to 5 years ($\phi_{20}$) 0.107
- 6 to 10 years ($\phi_{30}$) 0.190
- Over 10 years ($\phi_{40}$) 0.373

Tenure at job that lasted:
- 2 to 5 years ($\phi_s^2$) 0.028
- 6 to 10 years ($\phi_s^3$) 0.018
- Over 10 years ($\phi_s^4$) 0.035

Experience at job that lasted:
- Up to 1 year ($\phi_e^1$) -0.002
- 2 to 5 years ($\phi_e^2$) 0.0001
- 6 to 10 years ($\phi_e^3$) -0.003
- Over 10 years ($\phi_e^4$) -0.017

measure of employment to predicted consumption changes from the first stage, weighted by the working-age population in each state. The elasticity reported in panel D is computed by regressing changes in wages to changes in employment, weighted by the working-age population in each state.

References

Figure 1: Cross-Sectional Experience-Earnings Profiles from Census and PSID Data

Panel A: Profiles Based on Census Data

Panel B: Profiles Based on PSID Data