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THE POLITY IV PROJECT: AN INTRODUCTION

The Polity IV project continues the Polity research tradition of coding the authority characteristics of states in the world system for purposes of comparative, quantitative analysis. The original Polity conceptual scheme was formulated and the initial Polity I data collected under the direction of Ted Robert Gurr and informed by foundational, collaborative work with Harry Eckstein, Patterns of Authority: A Structural Basis for Political Inquiry (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1975). The Polity project has proven its value to researchers over the years, becoming the most widely used resource for monitoring regime change and studying the effects of regime authority. The Polity project has evolved through three earlier research phases, all under the direction of Ted Gurr. The Polity III phase updated core Polity data through 1992 and was later updated through 1998 and released as the Polity98 version. Through its evolution, the format of the Polity data has been transformed from its original focus on “persistence and change” in the “polity” as the unit of analysis (i.e., polity-case format) to its present country-year case format. The original Polity I format was revisited by a research team under the direction of Nils Petter Gleditsch and information concerning the dates of polity changes was updated in 1994 and made available in the original polity-case format as Polity IIIId. In the late 1990s, Polity became a core data project in the State Failure Task Force global analysis project. The special focus on “state failure” problem events within a general context of societal and systemic development processes requires information pertinent to both Polity foci, state continuity and change (country-year format) and regime persistence and change (polity-case format), be combined in a single data resource base. The Polity IV combined format was instituted with the 2000 data update.

The unit of analysis is the “polity.” Webster’s New World College Dictionary defines a “polity” as a “political or governmental organization; a society or institution with an organized government; state; body politic.” Eckstein and Gurr (1975, 26) provide a “simple, general definition of all ‘polities’ (or ‘governments’) as subsets of the class of ‘authority patterns.’” They further point out that “all authority patterns are ‘equivalents’ of state-organizations.” (25) Authority patterns are defined as “a set of asymmetric relations among hierarchically ordered members of a social unit that involves the direction of the unit....The direction of a social unit involves the definition of its goals, the regulation of conduct of its members, and the allocation and coordination of roles within it.” (22) They go on to identify three salient norms as bases of regime legitimacy: personal (executive recruitment), substantive (directiveness and responsiveness—executive constraints), and participation (political competition). While authority patterns and polities are inclusive classifications that refer to any social unit’s potential for political action, the Polity project focuses specifically on the more or less institutionalized authority patterns that characterize the most formal class of polities, that is, states operating within the world’s state system.

The state is the recognized central authority for a (potential) social unit that is delimited spatially through the identification of formal, territorial borders. This does not mean that the authority of the state is coincident with its spatial parameters; distinct areas and populations within this territorial space may be removed and secured from central state control by organized rebel and/or foreign forces. These separate areas may be effectively administered by traditional, separatist, or revolutionary authorities and, thus, constitute separate polities that operate outside the legally recognized polity of the state. The state and separatist polities can be said to have dis-integrated their authority patterns and structures such that the authority patterns of the state regime are not the authority patterns of the separatist regime and the separatist parties do not participate in (or factor into) the authority patterns of the state regime. The Polity project has collected information regarding only the authority patterns of the state regime without special consideration of the
existence or traits of non-state polities. The historical Polity data does not include information on
the territorial coverage of central state authority or the existence of non-state polities within its
borders (a coverage variable is included with the 1999 Polity updates). No direct inference should
be made from the data regarding the effective territorial scope of state authority.

Polity IV, under the direction of Monty G. Marshall (with Ted Gurr in a consulting role), combines
information essential to the two Polity conceptual formats, described above, to make it compatible
with the State Failure research approach. Therefore, we have made a concerted effort to distinguish
the regime and authority characteristics of the effective state polity from the use of organized, anti-
regime armed force to challenge and, possibly reject, that authority. That is, in order to better inform
the study of the relationships among governance, civil warfare, and group integration, authority
characteristics must be defined independently from potential antecedents, precipitants, and
consequences in non-governability and open warfare. The use (or threat) of armed force by a non-
state identity group may interfere with the definition of a state polity in two important ways: 1) by
limiting the effective spatial coverage, or control, of a state polity’s central authority, resulting in
polity fragmentation (i.e., separate polities) and 2) by affecting the polity’s governance
characteristics by stimulating factionalism within the state polity.

Polity fragmentation is not the only spatial qualification of the Polity regime authority data. The state
polity may extend armed force to establish and maintain authoritative control over areas outside
the recognized territorial borders of the state (in some cases, extra-territorial administration may
be imposed indirectly in response to a polity failure in the subject area, as in a “trust territory”). The
Polity project does not consider the special authority and participation issues raised in cases of
extra-territorial administration in assessing and coding the authority characteristics of the state
polity. In such cases of “colonial,” “occupied,” or “trust” territories under the effective extra-territorial
administration of a state polity, a separate polity is assumed (but not coded as a separate case).

Countries, in the modern context, are recognized as comprising multiple identity groupings with the
country’s ruling regime (polity) exhibiting varying degrees of effective governance, group inclusion,
and territorial coverage within its mandated borders. An important element in governance is the
relationship of identity groups to regime authority. Political elites representing distinct identity
groups may accept or oppose the regime’s authority or they may reject that authority (Hirschman’s
“loyalty, voice, or exit” options). One possible consequence of the rejection of regime authority is
an alternative identity group’s mobilization of armed force and prevent “foreign” governance by
establishing a new polity and “exiting,” removing the group’s territorial base from the effective
control of the rejected polity. Thus, a dilemma may arise, such as the current (2000) situations in
Cyprus, Bosnia, Colombia, and Sudan, where more than one polity exists within a single country.
In these cases of polity fragmentation, only the characteristics of the central state’s polity are
considered; that polity may be considered to be in a condition of “state failure” due to its inability
to exert its authority over (or to effect an accommodation with) the separatist group(s) and regions
(i.e., ethnic or revolutionary warfare). While the condition of “integration failure” reflects a real
limitation on the scope of political authority, that type of failure event is considered independent of
the polity’s authority characteristics.

A less pernicious form of group fragmentation occurs when a polity’s constituent groups harbor
antagonistic relations. Identity diversity may be effectively integrated and managed within the polity
(e.g., consociationalism or pluralism) or it may be politicized and mobilized as exclusive identity
cleavages and factions (i.e., factionalism) that are played out contentiously within the political
participation and competitiveness arenas of the central polity. Political factionalism may be dormant
(e.g., in pluralist polities), latent (e.g., in situations of regional autonomy within a polity), or active. And, particularly when it is active, factionalism challenges the coherence and cohesion of authority patterns within the shared, central polity. The main distinction between factionalism and fragmentation concerns the nature of group relations with the authoritative state: factionalism occurs inside the political arena of the polity, whereas fragmentation occurs when groups operate outside the political system and in direct opposition to state authority. Poorly managed factionalism within a polity may lead to fragmentation and, during the reconciliation process necessary to overcome fragmentation, increased factionalism is a likely consequence while groups work out the terms of accommodation. Polity coding procedures examine only the nature of group relations that are played out within the polity’s policy decision making system. A difficulty arises in that inter-group relations are rarely, perfectly situated either within or without the polity; there may be areas of overlap between factionalism and fragmentation as group members variously bridge the strategic gap between accommodation and division.

This codebook presents a substantial revision of earlier Polity codebooks, most notably the Polity II codebook: Ted Robert Gurr, Keith Jaggers, and Will H. Moore, “Polity II: Codebook” (Boulder: Center for Comparative Politics, University of Colorado, 1989; Ann Arbor: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research, 1990).

### Polity Project: Research Foundations

The present project builds on Ted Robert Gurr’s earlier study of "Persistence and Change in Political Systems, 1800-1971,” which used a more restricted dataset of the same kind to determine which authority traits characterized the more durable political systems, in different regions and in different historical periods. (Gurr, 1974) In the Polity I study the unit of analysis was the "polity" or political system, each of which was described in terms of six dimensions of authority patterns. When a polity was transformed by an abrupt, major change on one or more of these authority characteristics, the change was treated as the termination of the old polity and the establishment of a new one. The dependent variables in the analysis were the persistence and adaptability of each historical and contemporary polity. The measure of persistence was the number of years a polity endured without abrupt, major change: adaptability was the number of minor and gradual changes in a polity’s authority traits during its lifespan. The original author found, not surprisingly, that the most durable polities were ones which had undergone a number of minor or gradual changes in authority characteristics. Another significant finding was that polities which had internally consistent (“coherent”) democratic or autocratic traits tended to be more durable than polities characterized by mixed authority traits. Only in Europe, however, were democratic regimes significantly more durable than autocracies. Among historical polities—those no longer functioning in 1971—the relationship was reversed: autocracies had been more durable than democracies.

Some of these findings were confirmed, others qualified in subsequent reanalyses of the Polity I data by Ward (1974), Thiessen and Bays (1975), Harmel (1980), and Lichbach (1984). Harmel found that when he employed more restrictive definitions of abrupt polity change, democracies proved to have been more persistent and adaptable than autocracies historically and in most regions as well as the contemporary world. Whereas the other analyses were cross-sectional and cross-regional, Lichbach was concerned with sequences of political change in 49 historical and contemporary European states. He found no evidence that European states as a group followed similar patterns of change over time with respect to any one authority trait. He did find, however, that "[i]ncohherent polities tended, eventually, to become coherent. Coherent polities tended to
remain that way. That is, incoherent polities were short-lived experiments while coherent polities were longer-lived systems." (Lichbach 1984, 137) In other words there was no common, unidirectional movement in European societies toward coherent democracies. Rather, there was a century-long process of political experimentation in which the surviving polities gradually bifurcated into two sharply distinct groups: coherent democracies and coherent autocracies.

It proved difficult to use the original Polity I dataset for longitudinal analyses because of its structure: each polity's authority pattern was profiled only twice, one at its inception and once at its termination. Beginning in 1986 Gurr and his collaborators began to work on a new version of the dataset, Polity II, in which the authority traits of each country were coded annually. Carried out under the auspices of the Data Development for International Research (DDIR) project, the objective of the Polity II study was to develop longitudinal indicators of political structures and regime change. Encompassing most member states of the international system from 1800 to 1986, this dataset consisted of annual codings of regimes' structural characteristics, institutional changes, and the directionality of changes on underlying dimensions of democracy, autocracy, and power concentration. This required more thorough screening of historical sources to identify and code minor changes in authority traits. The Polity II dataset also incorporated some conceptual changes. Nine authority traits were coded for each polity in contrast with the six traits coded in Polity I.

The authority traits coded in the Polity II dataset for 152 countries could be analyzed in alternative ways. Each of the dimensions of authority could be examined separately, a procedure Lichbach (1984) followed using the Polity I dataset to study historical sequences of political development in Europe. Alternatively, the indicators are amendable to creating composite scores. In initial analysis of Polity II data by the authors led to the construction of three composite indicators of general properties of political systems: democracy, autocracy, and the centralization of power (Gurr, Jaggers, and Moore, 1990).

In the mid-1990s, the Polity III project revisited and streamlined the project’s conceptual foundations to focus on six component variables to capture the essential institutional authority properties of polities. Some highly subjective evaluations were abandoned. Also in the 1990s, a team of researchers under the direction of Nils Petter Gleditsch worked to recapture the original analytic utility of the Polity I scheme by reformatting the data to the regime format rather than the country-year format of Polity II. The resulting “out-of-house” Polity III data project attempted to identify particular regimes and date the regime transitions that bracketed specific polity regimes. The most recent iteration of the Polity project, Polity IV, combines the information essential to the two predominant approaches so that crucial analytical information will be captured and recorded such that either approach can be followed and both are supported. As presently constituted, the Polity IV dataset encompasses 162 contemporary countries (as of December 31, 2006), including all countries where the 2006 population exceeds five hundred thousand. The long-established members of the international system are coded beginning in 1800. More recently established countries are coded from the year in which their first independent government was formed, that is, beginning with the official date of the country’s independence. The polities of 20 historical Eurasian countries also are included, that is, countries like the Ottoman Empire, Bavaria, and the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies, which once enjoyed independence but subsequently broke up or were absorbed by others. A complete list of states, country codes, and the time-spans for which each polity is coded is provided in Appendix A.
Polity IV Enhancements and Inter-Coder Reliability

Before discussing the variables in detail, a brief word on the reliability of the authority codings is in order. The reliability of the indicators developed here depends on the accuracy and consistency of the coding of the constituent authority variables. The Polity I data were collected in the mid-1970s by a single coder, Erika Klee Gurr, who worked with increasingly refined versions of category definitions and coding guidelines. On three occasions all information gathered to date was reviewed and recoded by the coder, in consultation with Ted Gurr, to ensure its consistency with revised guidelines. Multiple historical sources were used for each country, along with reference to a variety of standard sources. The first step was to identify historical and social science works for each country, then to compile from them a basic political chronology. Periods of substantial change were identified in this process and then examined in detail to determine whether events met the specified criteria for changes in and of polities. The same sources provided information for the coding of authority characteristics.

The Polity I Codebook, dataset, and narrative summaries of the political chronologies for each polity, with source lists, were deposited with and subsequently distributed by the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research (Gurr and Associates, 1978). The reliability of authority codings have been taken as a given by most of the investigators who have used them in secondary analyses. A notable exception is Lichbach (1984), who detected some ambiguities about the timing of minor changes in authority traits when converting the European codings to time-series form. He resolved them by further reading in historical sources. The construction of Polity II was begun by Mark Lichbach, who converted the remaining Polity I codings to annual data, and completed by Keith Jaggers, who recoded and extended the dataset using a wide variety of historical and contemporary source materials. As Principal Investigator, Ted Gurr reviewed much of the coding, with special attention to questions of consistency. The Polity II coding guidelines were amplified and refined in the process. The Polity codings relevant to regime changes were revisited by the Polity IIId alternative team of researchers (based at the Peace Research Institute of Oslo, PRIO, in Norway) as they investigated transitions with the intention of establishing specific dates for these changes. Their reexamination increased confidence in the codings. Other researchers, particularly Michael Ward and Kristian Gleditsch, have tested the various iterations and updates of the Polity data for internal consistency and structured errors and several errors have been corrected as a result.

No inter-coder reliability tests were carried out during the earlier phases of the Polity coding. Project researchers were reasonably confident that the coding guidelines were applied consistently because they were developed and used by four people who worked with them intensively and over a long period of time. The fact that coding was done by four individuals also lends confidence that the judgments do not reflect the idiosyncratic interpretations of one individual—and if they do, the idiosyncracies are explicit in the coding guidelines and thus subject to revision by other scholars.

A related question is whether the sources examined prior to earlier codings were sufficiently complete and accurate. This is a potential threat to the reliability and validity of the codings for some minor European and Latin American states during the nineteenth century for which source materials are scarce. Accurate coding of Executive Constraints, for example, requires political analyses with a depth not often included in summary histories. A few of the predecessor states of Imperial Germany that nominally qualify for inclusion in Polity I and II were not coded for lack of adequate English-language sources.
In the year 2000, a substantial procedural enhancement of the Polity coding project was initiated to increase general confidence in the data and with the intention of institutionalizing the project for annual updates and semi-annual reports. Substantial documentation procedures and cross-checks of coding decisions, including the first inter-coder reliability checks, were implemented at that time. Polity IV procedural enhancements are outlined in Appendix B. New researchers were brought into the project and trained in established Polity coding procedures. An initial training exercise used sixteen, randomly selected cases to examine coder training and inter-coder reliability issues (each case was coded independently for 1999 by at least four coders and the multiple codings were compared with 1998 codes assigned during the previous round of research). Coding discrepancies were discussed collectively to refine concepts and coding guidelines and enhance coder training. Once a common understanding the coding procedures was established, the remaining 145 cases were randomly divided between two research teams, one at the University of Maryland under the direction of Dr. Marshall and another at the University of Colorado under the direction of Dr. Jaggers. Each country’s 1999 authority characteristics were examined and coded and, then, the results were compared with the 1998 codes. These comparisons allowed a second inter-coder reliability test. In addition, a second, hidden subset of sixteen cases were randomly selected and assigned to coders at both research locations and constituted a third inter-coder reliability test.

The results of the inter-coder reliability checks increase the general claims of consistency in the articulation and application of Polity codes to individual cases. A comparison of codes assigned during the initial training set of sixteen cases (cases coded independently by all coders) can not be used for an accurate analysis of inter-coder reliability as those results were affected by both inter-coder differences of application and incomplete comprehension of existing versions of the Polity coding guidelines. The initial training exercise prompted fine-turning of the guidelines; subsequent biweekly discussions of coding difficulties helped to refine the guidelines even further. The initial results showed a high degree of coding convergence despite some serious ambiguities in the coding guidelines (i.e., ambiguities in communication to and comprehension by new coders).

Much of the concern voiced by new coders centered on **ambiguities in terminology** used (e.g., the terms “faction” and “transition” were used with multiple conceptual meanings); these ambiguities were addressed by replacing multiple uses of single terms with uniquely defined and qualified terminology. **Conceptual ambiguities** centered on the definition of the subject of study (i.e., the “polity”); the tenor of political interaction with the Polity, whether authority was accepted or rejected and whether interactions among competing political actors were essentially cooperative, conflictual, or contentious (e.g., “factionalism”); and inclusion and exclusion of groups vis-a-vis the state (e.g., “fragmentation” and the existence of alternative polities within a political state). Conceptual ambiguities were addressed through the addition of greater detail and further explanation in the coding guidelines. Other **application ambiguities** revealed during the coding procedures resulted from limited information and/or the idiosyncratic qualities of individual polities at particular points in time. These ambiguities were addressed by collecting more information and examining more closely the peculiarities of cases to narrow categorical applications and increase confidence in assigning codes to the “special cases” (e.g., assigning a “dual executive—ascription + election” in the case of late-1990s Iran to cover the unique combination of theocracy and elections). **Recruitment ambiguities** concerned the longevity of personalistic leaders and the “incumbency” advantages that personalistic leaders enjoy during a “transition” to “open” electoral recruitment patterns. This ambiguity was addressed by stressing that the openness of executive electoral recruitment is contingent on the actual, conventional transfer of executive authority through an electoral process, that is, electoral process can only be viewed as institutionalized with a conventional transfer of executive office according to the results of due electoral process. The most
resourceful, personalistic leaders are able to retain power despite ritual elections; the authority of elections is established upon the transfer of power. Examination of the various ambiguities, and the collective solutions to those ambiguities that developed during the coding discourses, informed extensive additions and revisions of the Polity IV Codebook. The expanded text is designed to facilitate both coding applications and user comprehension.

Of the one hundred sixty-one (161) cases coded for the target year (1999), thirteen (13) experienced regime changes in the target year, leaving a pool of one hundred forty-eight (148) cases for reliability comparison with codes assigned by separate coders and codes assigned for the same Polity in the previous research rounds (1998 and earlier). New, annualized coding procedures give the Polity coding process an important reliability and internal accuracy check. The authority patterns of a Polity are largely consistent over the short to medium term; “connecting” annual codes in an annualized coding format places both current and prior coding decisions under additional scrutiny. Of the one hundred forty-eight (148) cases compared across time, seventy-four (74) resulted in the assignment of identical POLITY codes; in forty-five (45) cases the results were within one point on the POLITY variable; and twelve cases were within two POLITY points. In all, over eighty-eight percent of the cases were coded within two points along the twenty-point POLITY range. The results in seventeen (17) cases varied more than two POLITY points. As there was no evidence of substantive regime changes in any of these seventeen cases, it was necessary to review and reconcile the cases before final scores could assigned. Of the seventeen (17) cases subjected to further reconciliation review. Recruitment ambiguities accounted for coding discrepancies in eight (8) cases; cases were coded as institutionalized elections without evidence of an effective transfer of executive power. Application ambiguities were involved in nine (9) cases with two (2) of those nine cases revised in accordance with codes for the previous year(s) and seven (7) cases revised historically to bring them in accordance with newly assigned codes. By far, the most common coding discrepancies involved assigning scale values to the executive constraints variables (XCONST and EXCONST–identical component and concept variables); assigned scores often varied by one point and sometimes by two points. Some of this “oscillation” or “fuzziness” can be explained by the fact that executive power often varies from year to year according to variations in political circumstances and dynamics. Gauging the exact degree of constraints on executive power is difficult at any single point in time; these constraints are necessarily established by general practice over time. Results of the more focused comparison of sixteen (16) cases selected and assigned to multiple coders were consistent with the more general results described here.

Confidence in the accuracy and reliability of historical cases in the Polity dataset was bolstered in the mid-1990s as a team of researchers under the direction of Nils Petter Gleditsch revisited the historical cases in order to assign more accurate dates to each of the changes in assigned polity scores (see McLaughlin et al 1998). As such, each of the historical cases in the Polity dataset were subjected to independent scrutiny and all changes in polity values were verified individually. The result of this “out-of-house” research was the production of the Polity IIId dataset already mentioned and described above. Polity IV has merged the Polity IIId dates with the Polity historical codes; some minor discrepancies were found to exist between the two data sources and each discrepancy was reconciled in the Polity IV dataset. In cases of minor coding discrepancies, the original Polity codes were assumed to be authoritative codes for polity characteristics and the Polity IIId dates were assumed to be authoritative in establishing the time of changes in codes. Major discrepancies were reconciled through additional research.
In summation, the Polity project’s data collection and updating procedures contain periodic coding review and revision mechanisms that maintain a high degree of reliability and consistency in the dataset. Polity IV procedural enhancements have further expanded and upgraded these quality assurance mechanisms (see Appendix B for an outline of new procedures). Of special concern is the fluidity of real-time political dynamics and the effects this immediacy may have on the assignment of Polity codes on a semi-annual research cycle. Narrative documentation enhancements have been instituted to facilitate the comparison, review, and revision process (see Appendix C for a summary of new guidelines). The alteration of data reporting procedures from a fixed (“artificially smoothed,” see below) format to a “free-floating” and flagged format will help maintain data quality across updating cycles. Of special note in this regard has been the general effects of the end of the Cold War on Polity update research: a dramatic increase in general political pressure by global actors to increase and expand democratization throughout the world system has led to incredible claims of liberalization by the leadership of formerly non-democratic regimes. Over the course of the 1990s, many of these claims have proved, through evidence of actual practices, to have remained unsubstantiated. Overly optimistic coding assignments based on early 1990s democratization claims and superficial procedural changes have been revised to reflect unfolding realities and a slower pace to democracy’s “third wave” (Jaggers and Gurr 1995).

Recent Developments and Additions

In 2002, a new variable was added to the Polity IV data series: POLITY2, in order to facilitate the use of the POLITY regime measure in time-series analyses. This variable modifies the combined annual POLITY score by applying a simple treatment, or "fix," to convert instances of "standardized authority codes" (i.e., -66, -77, and -88) to conventional polity scores (i.e., within the range, -10 to +10); for details, see POLITY2 variable description below.

During the Summer 2003, Kyle Beardsley (a Graduate Student at the University of California, San Diego working with Polity IV Board Member Professor Kristian Gleditsch) converted the Polity IV time-series data to the original "polity-case" format (similar to the more recent Polity IVd reformatting). The Polity IVd dataset contains the same basic regime authority information as the Polity IV time-series data, but in a format in which the "polity-case" (rather than the "country-year") is the unit of analysis. That is, each observation (case) gives information for a polity over a discreet time period during which the scores on all of the component variables remain unchanged. When any change is recorded in at least one of the component variables, a new observation begins and lasts until the date of the next change. This format allows greater transparency and facilitates analysis of regime changes. Some words of caution are necessary, however. The dates of polity transition are often approximate or tagged to political events that provide evidence for recordable changes in the qualities of institutional authority, such as elections, boycotts, acts of legislation, or transfers of executive power. Polity transitions are often quite fluid, or volatile, and often result in unintended institutional arrangements; these more complex transition situations are usually denoted with a special "standardized code" for "transitions" (i.e., -88). In addition, many changes in regime behavior take months and even years to fully manifest themselves; this may be especially true for small or nuanced changes. The date "precision" variables are provided to help inform the user to the varying degrees of confidence in pinpointing the timing of regime changes. **Note that the Polity IV time-series transition information uses a different standard than Polity IVd for reporting regime changes: the annual time-series data combines incremental changes of short duration (in the same positive or negative direction) into a "multi-year" transition period; the**
Polity IVd version records a new case line for each recorded change, no matter how small or short in duration.

Each annual update of the Polity data series since 2000 includes a systematic re-examination of country codings over the previous five years and a review of cases that have raised concern and resulted in specific inquiries by data users. These inquiries are researched and reconciled and may result in corrections to the historical data. One substantive correction of cases involved the inclusion of a number of country years for polities considered to be “self-governing territories” rather than the more conventional “independent states.” British colonial territories were much more likely than the colonial territories of other imperial regimes to gain the status of “self-governing territories” and, thus, including these polities, while true to the original conceptualization of the “polity,” introduces a potential bias in the dataset. “State” case coverage now begins with the officially-recognized date of independence for each country in the data series. Several scholars have discussed the possibility of extending the Polity coding guidelines to cover colonial territories systematically and this possibility may present a more meaningful application of the Polity concepts. As presently envisioned, this would require the development of a separate data series that a user could merge with the state time-series data. This extension of coverage is under consideration, but there are no current plans to develop this application.

Accompanying each annual update of the Polity IV data series is an Excel spreadsheet containing a “change log” of all changes made in the data, both for the update year (i.e., changes from the previous year’s coding) and any prior years (reflecting revisions/corrections made in the historical records). The country record logging each change lists the most recent, unchanged annual record for that country followed by each changed annual record for the country, along with a brief explanation for the change. Each changed record is noted in the first column, headed “CHANGE,” with a “1” in that column; the first column for referent, unchanged records is left blank. The “change log” file is identified by a “ch” in the file name; for example, the change log for the 2015 annual update is titled <p4ch2015.xls>.

Preparing for the Future: Polity V

The original Polity scheme was designed during the preceding era defined by the competition between autocratic and democratic regimes for preeminence in world politics, that is, the Cold War period. That era coincided with the collapse of the colonial world order and the emergence of many new countries governed by newly established authority regimes. The emergence of newly independent states from the colonial territories of mainly Western countries (temporarily) shifted the global balance of authority toward greater autocracy. Indeed, when the first Polity data series was completed in the mid-1970s, the number of autocratic regimes had increased to almost triple the number of democratic regimes. Nearly all democratic experiments in newly independent countries during the Cold War succumbed to autocratic authority within a few years. The competition between democratic and autocratic authority systems was reflected in a focus on “transitions” from one mode of authority to another in particular countries and in the attendant problem of “incomplete transitions” and the appearance of “incoherent” polities, or “anocracies,” in which odd combinations of democratic and autocratic authority patterns could be observed. In truth, the Polity original scheme was intrinsically biased toward democratic authority. This means that the standards applied to judge democratic authority were less strict than those applied to autocratic authority, resulting in a tendency to “corral” democratic regimes in the (+10) end of the DEMOC scale. In an autocracy-preeminent world system, the effects of this bias were somewhat muted; however, with the ending of the Cold War and the concomitant transformation to a
In order to prepare the Polity scheme for the future, we have been examining and reconsidering the scheme’s democratic bias and designing ways to better capture key variations in democratic authority patterns while maintaining the original theoretical perspective. Over the past four years, we have been systematically reviewing the authority characteristics and dynamics of each country covered in the Polity data series over the contemporary period, 1946-present, using the monthly reports provided by the Keesings Online electronic archive. As a result of these reviews, we are revising and refining the codings for all countries to better reflect the institutional quality of democratic authority; in this process, we are also correcting and refining records of autocratic authority. Most affected by this refinement process will be the consistency of Polity codings and the accuracy of the dating and rationale for Polity changes. In order to make the Polity data series more accurate and reliable in quantitative analysis, we are verifying, refining, and describing all Polity changes in a detailed Polity Change Log for each country. In effect, the changes will more accurately distribute regimes on the DEMOC scale rather than “corralling” cases on the extreme end of the scale. This process began with an in-depth examination of cases of “factionalism” (PARCOMP = 3; POLCOMP = 6 or 7) as this condition was identified in Political Instability Task Force analyses (e.g., Goldstone et al 2010) as a key problem in democratic transition; the coded condition of “factionalism” was also identified as a potential “corruption of the data” in the analysis of conflict factors (e.g., Vreeland 2008).

While our systematic review has strongly supported our confidence in the veracity of the “factionalism” concept and the consistency of its identification in the Polity records, that review has also enabled us to strengthen the consistency and accuracy of Polity codings and datings and better refine the institutional qualities of democratic authority. Such refinements include differentiating between “executive-guided transitions” (EXREC = 5) and broader “whole-of-government” or “whole-of-society” transitions; distinguishing between “transitional or restricted elections” (EXREC = 7) and “competitive elections” (EXREC = 8) in executive recruitment; utilizing “uninstitutionalized competition” (POLCOMP = 4) and “gradual transition from uninstitutionalized competition” (POLCOMP = 5; e.g., nascent, ad hoc, fluid, or personality-based party organizations); and gauging the degree of coercion utilized in the broader structure of Political Competition dynamics (POLCOMP = 8, 9, or 10). The intent of this effort is to enable effective use of concept and component variables in analyses and to increase the data series’ analytic capacity for examining regime changes and, especially, democratization and consolidation. The refined data series and the Polity Change Log documentation will be issued as Polity V once the systematic review is completed.
POLITY VARIABLES

It should be noted that the historical Polity data has been "artificially smoothed," that is, minor fluctuations in a polity's authority characteristics may not be reflected in the data. Rather, the data codes general institutionalized authority traits that characterize a distinct polity (a polity distinguished by distinct and identifiable regime changes at both its inception and its termination); annual case codes for all years between polity inception and termination are generally the same. Some minor, or incremental, changes do appear in annual polity codes as a result of focused research on a specific regime changes reveals that the change occurred over a period of several years, rather than a sudden or abrupt change in authority traits. This data "smoothing" reflects the generally limited quality of historical information sources. Established Polity recording techniques present two problems in contemporary data updates: 1) General traits are difficult to identify in current information; general traits are only revealed, accurately, over the span of several years, so, initial Polity codings following a regime change are necessarily tentative and may need to be revised later as general traits are identified in accumulated information. Of course, with the analysis of politics there is always a problematic gap between rhetoric and reality and, until an accumulation of evidence can be gathered, the nature of that gap will be difficult to assess. 2) Real time monitoring of political events, given the improved quality of information resources, allows a finer assessment of authority traits and regime changes. This makes incremental changes in annual scores more accurate and more meaningful to policy analysis. Minor changes in authority traits mainly capture changes in the dynamics of executive power and political competition (factionalism); in some cases, minor changes may reflect transitional moves in executive recruitment.

As such, and as current plans call for semi-annual assessments and reports of polity changes, the annual Polity scores, beginning with the 1990s' updates, may reflect minor changes in authority traits during the lifespan of a distinct polity; over the course of ensuing update cycles, assigned polity codes are re-considered in light of new information. This review process may result in some retroactive revisions of recent Polity codes to reflect emerging institutional patterns of authority. All changes in assigned polity codes are denoted by variables in section 4, "Polity Regime Transitions" (described below); years during which no changes in polity codes are recorded are blank across section 4 variables.

1. Country and Case Identifier Codes

1.0 PRESENT (p4d only)
Present case identifier: Flag variable that identifies the case record for each country that includes the present regime (end date variables: EMONTH, EDAY, and EYEAR, are coded all 9's, see below); coded "1" for present regime, otherwise blank.

1.1 CYEAR (p4 only)
Country Year: A unique identifier for each country year, consisting of the country code, CCODE, followed by the year. This variable was created to facilitate merging.

1.2 CCODE (all versions)
Numeric Country Code: Each country in the Polity IV dataset is defined by a three-digit numeric code, derived from the Correlates of War's listing of members of the interstate system.
1.3 SCODE (all versions)
Alpha Country Code: Each country in the Polity IV dataset is defined by a three-letter alpha code, derived from the Correlates of War's listing of members of the interstate system.

1.4 YEAR (p4 only)
Year Coded: A four digit code is used. Polity codes are assigned according to the regime in place on December 31 of the year coded.

1.5 FLAG (p4 only)
Tentative Coding: Each case (country-year) is flagged with this trichotomous indicator denoting the coders’ general confidence in the component variable scores assigned during a Polity annual update. A “0” code indicates reasonable confidence in the codings listed and is assigned to all historical cases. A “1” code indicates that codings covering a period of up to five years since a recent polity change are considered tentative as new authority patterns emerge and coalesce; these cases are subject to review and possible revision or “smoothing” (see above). A “2” code indicates that information is limited and, so, there are reservations concerning the code assigned, often because a polity change has occurred very recently and insufficient time has elapsed to render a confident judgement of the nature of authority changes; the codes assigned are considered a “best assessment” that require further review and possible revision. **Under no circumstances should a case be flagged for more than five years prior to the most current update period.** The component variable values for all flagged annual-cases will be included in the annual Polity coding update for further review until the information available for those flagged cases is considered sufficient for making a reasonably confident assessment. At that time, the cases will be assigned confident values and the FLAG variable value will be changed to “0.”

(0) Confident: Reasonably confident coding of established authority patterns that have been “artificially smoothed” to present consistency over time between substantive polity changes.

(1) Tentative: Reasonably confident coding of emerging authority patterns that have not been smoothed over time; these codes are “free floating,” that is, they are based on information available in the case-year and are not tied to prior year coding(s). Codes are considered tentative for up to five years following a substantive polity change.

(2) Tenuous: Best judgement coding based on limited information and/or insufficient time span since a substantive polity change and the emergence of new authority patterns.

1.6 FRAGMENT (p4 only)
Polity Fragmentation: This variable codes the operational existence of a separate polity, or polities, comprising substantial territory and population within the recognized borders of the state and over which the coded polity exercises no effective authority (effective authority may be participatory or coercive). Local autonomy arrangements voluntarily established and accepted by both central and local authorities are not considered fragmentation. A polity that cannot exercise relatively effective authority over at least 50 percent of its established territory is necessarily considered to be in a condition of “state failure” (i.e., interruption or interregnum, see below, that may or may not coincide with active civil war). Polity fragmentation may result from open warfare (active or latent) or foreign occupation and may continue in the absence of open warfare as a situation of de facto separation remains unresolved and unchallenged by the state. Examples of de facto separation are northern Cyprus since 1975 (with Turkish occupation), Nagorno-Karabakh in Azerbaijan since 1994 (with Armenian occupation), Republika Srpska in Bosnia since
1995 (with NATO occupation), Abkhazia and South Ossetia in Georgia from 1994, Chechnya in
Russia from 1996 to 1999, and Kosovo in Serbia from 1999 to 2008 (Kosovo became a contested,
independent state in 2008). This variable is coded beginning only in the year 2000; it is blank
for all prior years (i.e., it has not yet been coded historically).

(0) No overt fragmentation

(1) Slight fragmentation: Less than ten percent of the country’s territory is effectively under
local authority and actively separated from the central authority of the regime.

(2) Moderate fragmentation: Ten to twenty-five percent of the country’s territory is effectively
ruled by local authority and actively separated from the central authority of the regime.

(3) Serious fragmentation: Over twenty-five percent (and up to fifty percent) of the country’s
territory is effectively ruled by local authority and actively separated from the central
authority of the regime.

2. Indicators of Democracy and Autocracy (Composite Indicators)

Three broad processes have reshaped the global landscape of state structures during the last two
centuries. One is an extraordinary expansion in the absolute and relative power of the state, a
process that began in Europe. The new states created by the American and French revolutions
marked the threshold between a political world dominated by monarchies, whose claims to
absolutism were belied by the fact that most social and economic life was autonomous from state
control or extraction, and a political world in which state power was based on ever-widening control
and mobilization of human and material resources in exchange for broadened rights of popular
participation. An integral part of this process was the development of bureaucracies with high
capacities to regulate, tax, and mobilize people in the service of state policy.

The second process was the transformation of the structures of political participation and
legitimation. This transformation followed one of two paths, toward plural democracy or mass-party
autocracy. The popular side of the bargain by which most West European rulers built state power
in the nineteenth century was to acknowledge the right of widespread participation in policy making.
That right was given institutional expression in elected assemblies which could review, and
sometimes initiate, public policy; in elections, direct or indirect, of chief ministers; and in recognition
of citizens’ rights to voice and act on political opinions. The concept of bargain is a metaphor for
sequences of political crises and reforms in which these rulers granted rights for participation,
however limited, to all significant social classes and groups, while simultaneously extending the
state’s right and capacity to regulate, tax, and mobilize the human and material bases of state
power.

The process of political democratization had its own logic and dynamic which, in most of Western
Europe, eroded all but a few symbolic vestiges of traditional autocracy (see for example Bendix
1978). Nonetheless, pressures to extend democratization have always contended with the self-
interested desire of rulers to preserve and enhance their autonomy from political constraints. The
empires of Central and Eastern Europe—Germany, Russia, Austro-Hungary—implemented the
trappings but not the substance of effective democratic participation in the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries. And all of them collapsed under the combined pressure of unsuccessful wars
and internal dissension. The revolutionary Soviet state in Russia provided a new model of autocracy which combined democratic forms—a mass party and nominally representative institutions—with near-absolute state control of social, economic and political life. In the middle run the new model was proven, in Europe and China, to be almost as resilient as the Western democratic forms, although less efficient for some social and economic purposes. The largely peaceful, post-1990 transformations of Soviet states to more liberal democratic forms of governance appears to authenticate the democratic, normative element in this model and its influence on the quality of authority transition.

The third general process has been the "Westernization" of state structures elsewhere in the world. The European-derived models have been widely imitated, beginning with the establishment of derivative democracies in the newly independent states of nineteenth century Latin America and concluding with the socialist autocracies of most of the post-revolutionary states of contemporary Afro-Asia.

In an attempt to facilitate empirical analysis of these and other historical trends, Polity IV includes constructed annual measures for both institutionalized democracy (DEMOC) and autocracy (AUTOC), as many polities exhibit mixed qualities of both of these distinct authority patterns. The measures are composite indices derived from the coded values of authority characteristic component variables (variables 3.1-3.6, see below) according to the formulas, originally designed by Gurr, provided below. A third indicator, POLITY, is derived simply by subtracting the AUTOC value from the DEMOC value; this procedure provides a single regime score that ranges from +10 (full democracy) to −10 (full autocracy). During periods of central authority interruption, collapse, or transition, the DEMOC, AUTOC, and POLITY scores will be the assigned Standardized Authority Code (see Section 3, below). The fourth variable listed in this section, DURABLE, provides a running measure of the durability of the regime’s authority pattern for a given year, that is, the number of years since the last substantive change in authority characteristics (defined as a 3-point change in the POLITY score).

2.1 DEMOC (all versions)
Institutionalized Democracy: Democracy is conceived as three essential, interdependent elements. One is the presence of institutions and procedures through which citizens can express effective preferences about alternative policies and leaders. Second is the existence of institutionalized constraints on the exercise of power by the executive. Third is the guarantee of civil liberties to all citizens in their daily lives and in acts of political participation. Other aspects of plural democracy, such as the rule of law, systems of checks and balances, freedom of the press, and so on are means to, or specific manifestations of, these general principles. We do not include coded data on civil liberties.

The Democracy indicator is an additive eleven-point scale (0-10). The operational indicator of democracy is derived from codings of the competitiveness of political participation (variable 2.6), the openness and competitiveness of executive recruitment (variables 2.3 and 2.2), and constraints on the chief executive (variable 2.4) using the following weights:
**Authority Coding**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Competitiveness of Executive Recruitment (XRCOMP):</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(3) Election</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2) Transitional</td>
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</tbody>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Scale Weight</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>+2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>+1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Openness of Executive Recruitment (XROPEN):**

only if XRCOMP is Election (3) or Transitional (2)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Scale Weight</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>+1</td>
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<tr>
<td>+1</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

**Constraint on Chief Executive (XCONST):**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Scale Weight</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>+4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>+3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>+2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>+1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Competitiveness of Political Participation (PARCOMP):**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Scale Weight</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>+3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>+2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>+1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This "institutional democracy" indicator follows a logic similar to that underlying the Polity I analyses. There is no "necessary condition" for characterizing a political system as democratic, rather democracy is treated as a variable. For example, the scale discriminates among Western parliamentary and presidential systems based on the extent of constraints on the chief executive. Charles de Gaulle as president of the French Fifth Republic operated within slight to moderate political limitations. Thus the early years of the Fifth Republic have lower Democracy scores than the United States or the Federal Republic of Germany, where constraints on the executive approach parity. Similarly, the onset of "cohabitation" in France during the second phase of the first Mitterrand presidency is marked by a shift toward parity on the Executive Constraints scale and a concomitant increase in France's Democracy score.

If the composite indicator of institutionalized democracy is inappropriate for some conceptual purposes, it can be easily redefined either by altering the constituent categories and weights, or by specifying some minimum preconditions. **A mature and internally coherent democracy, for example, might be operationally defined as one in which (a) political participation is unrestricted, open, and fully competitive; (b) executive recruitment is elective, and (c) constraints on the chief executive are substantial.**

### 2.2 AUTOC (all versions)

Institutionalized Autocracy: "Authoritarian regime" in Western political discourse is a pejorative term for some very diverse kinds of political systems whose common properties are a lack of regularized political competition and concern for political freedoms. We use the more neutral term Autocracy and define it operationally in terms of the presence of a distinctive set of political characteristics. In mature form, autocracies sharply restrict or suppress competitive political participation. Their chief executives are chosen in a regularized process of selection within the political elite, and once in office they exercise power with few institutional constraints. Most modern autocracies also exercise a high degree of directiveness over social and economic activity, but we regard this as a
function of political ideology and choice, not a defining property of autocracy. Social democracies also exercise relatively high degrees of directiveness. We prefer to leave open for empirical investigation the question of how Autocracy, Democracy, and Directiveness (performance) have covaried over time.

An eleven-point Autocracy scale is constructed additively. Our operational indicator of autocracy is derived from codings of the competitiveness of political participation (variable 2.6), the regulation of participation (variable 2.5), the openness and competitiveness of executive recruitment (variables 2.2 and 2.3), and constraints on the chief executive (variable 2.4) using the following weights:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Authority Coding</th>
<th>Scale Weight</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><em>Competitiveness of Executive Recruitment (XRCOMP)</em>:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1) Selection</td>
<td>+2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Openness of Executive Recruitment (XROPEN):</em></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>only if XRCOMP is coded Selection (1)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1) Closed</td>
<td>+1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2) Dual/designation</td>
<td>+1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Constraints on Chief Executive (XCONST):</em></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1) Unlimited authority</td>
<td>+3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2) Intermediate category</td>
<td>+2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(3) Slight to moderate limitations</td>
<td>+1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Regulation of participation (PARREG):</em></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(4) Restricted</td>
<td>+2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(3) Sectarian</td>
<td>+1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Competitiveness of Participation (PARCOMP):</em></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1) Repressed</td>
<td>+2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2) Suppressed</td>
<td>+1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The logic of this "institutionalized autocracy" scale is similar to that of the institutionalized democracy scale, below, and it is subject to the same kinds of operational redefinition to suit different theoretical purposes. Note that the two scales do not share any categories in common. Nonetheless many polities have mixed authority traits, and thus can have middling scores on both Autocracy and Democracy scales. These are the kinds of polities which were characterized as "anocratic" and "incoherent" in the Polity I studies. As a group they proved to less durable than coherent democracies and autocracies (see Gurr 1974, Harmel 1980, Lichbach 1984).

### 2.3 POLITY (all versions)

Combined Polity Score: The POLITY score is computed by subtracting the AUTOC score from the DEMOC score; the resulting unified polity scale ranges from +10 (strongly democratic) to -10 (strongly autocratic). **Note:** The POLITY score was added to the Polity IV data series in recognition of its common usage by users in quantitative research and in the overriding interest of maintaining uniformity among users in this application. The simple combination of the original DEMOC and AUTOC index values in a unitary POLITY scale, in many ways, runs contrary to the original theory stated by Eckstein and Gurr in *Patterns of Authority*.
(1975) and, so, should be treated and interpreted with due caution its primary utility is in investigative research which should be augmented by more detailed analysis. The original theory posits that autocratic and democratic authority are distinct patterns of authority, elements of which may co-exist in any particular regime context. The inclusion of this variable in the data series should not be seen as an acceptance of the counter-proposal that autocracy and democracy are alternatives or opposites in a unified authority spectrum, even though elements of this perspective may be implied in the original theory. The POLITY variable provides a convenient avenue for examining general regime effects in analyses but researchers should note that the middle of the implied POLITY "spectrum" is somewhat muddled in terms of the original theory, masking various combinations of DEMOC and AUTOC scores with the same POLITY score. Investigations involving hypotheses of varying effects of democracy and/or autocracy should employ the original Polity scheme and test DEMOC and AUTOC separately.

2.4 POLITY2 (p4 only)
Revised Combined Polity Score: This variable is a modified version of the POLITY variable added in order to facilitate the use of the POLITY regime measure in time-series analyses. It modifies the combined annual POLITY score by applying a simple treatment, or “fix,” to convert instances of “standardized authority scores” (i.e., -66, -77, and -88) to conventional polity scores (i.e., within the range, -10 to +10). The values have been converted according to the following rule set:
-66 Cases of foreign “interruption” are treated as “system missing.”
-77 Cases of “interregnum,” or anarchy, are converted to a “neutral” Polity score of “0.”
-88 Cases of “transition” are prorated across the span of the transition. For example, country X has a POLITY score of -7 in 1957, followed by three years of -88 and, finally, a score of +5 in 1961. The change (+12) would be prorated over the intervening three years at a rate of per year, so that the converted scores would be as follows: 1957 -7; 1958 -4; 1959 -1; 1960 +2; and 1961 +5.

Note: Ongoing (-88) transitions in the most recent year (2006) are converted to “system missing” values. Transitions (-88) following a year of independence, interruption (-66), or interregnum (-77) are prorated from the value “0.”

2.5 DURABLE (p4 only)
Regime Durability: The number of years since the most recent regime change (defined by a three-point change in the POLITY score over a period of three years or less) or the end of transition period defined by the lack of stable political institutions (denoted by a standardized authority score). In calculating the DURABLE value, the first year during which a new (post-change) polity is established is coded as the baseline “year zero” (value = 0) and each subsequent year adds one to the value of the DURABLE variable consecutively until a new regime change or transition period occurs. Values are entered for all years beginning with the first regime change since 1800 or the date of independence if that event occurred after 1800.

2.6 PERSIST (p4d only)
Polity Persistence: The (rounded) number of years the polity has persisted without a recorded change in values on any of the six Polity component variables (see below). This variable differs from the DURABLE variable above on the basis of the level of change used to denote a “new” polity: DURABLE is based on a 3-point change on the POLITY index (or lapse into a special condition denoted by a “standardized authority code”), whereas the PERSIST variable is based on
any change in any of the six component variables (some of these changes may not be reflected in a change on the POLITY index).

3. Authority Characteristics – Polity Component Variables

The conceptual framework for the polity studies was derived from Harry Eckstein's analytic scheme for describing patterns of authority. The scheme was designed "to apply to authority patterns in any and all social units, regardless of variations...and regardless of whether the units exhibit great or little overall asymmetry between superordinates and subordinates" (Eckstein and Gurr 1975, p.41). It identifies five different clusters of dimensions on which authority patterns vary, including (1) four dimensions of influence relations between superordinate and subordinate strata (Directiveness, Participation, Responsiveness, and Compliance); (2) two dimensions of inequality between these strata (Distance and Deportment); (3) three dimensions characterizing relations among superordinates (Conformation, Decision-Rules, and Decision-Behavior); (4) the Competitiveness of recruitment to superordinate positions; and (5) the Bases of legitimacy, whether personal, substantive or procedural. A number of these dimensions consist of several subdimensions. The polarities of each dimension are identified, along with intervening categories of them.

This complex scheme permits far more detailed analysis and more subtle distinctions among authority patterns than does a simple democratic-autocratic continuum. On the other hand, only some of its distinctions are relevant to our understanding of differences among political systems, and not all of these can be assessed operationally over the long historical run. Consequently the Polity IV project focuses on six operational indicators of political authority patterns, with special attention to the Influence dimensions, the Recruitment of chief executive, and aspects of Conformation, i.e., governmental structure.

Note that a sudden change in a polity's executive, for example, through a violent or non-violent coup d'état, does not necessarily constitute a change in authority patterns for the polity (it is usually an example of an extra-judicial leadership change). Polity codes will be unaffected by a change in personal leadership if regime authority patterns and structures remain unchanged. An exception to this general rule occurs in cases of social revolution; in those cases where there is a fundamental transformation in the ideology, structure, and leadership of governance a requisite condition of a "complete collapse of central political authority" (i.e., state failure or “interregnum,” see below) must have occurred prior to the establishment of the new regime. This change will be reflected in the polity's regime change variables (section 4, below), even though the new regime imposes identical authority patterns, as is the case in Cambodia 1975, Afghanistan 1978-9, and Iran 1979.

Using multiple historical sources for each country, along with reference to a variety of standard sources, the six operational indicators of authority characteristics are elaborated into a series of ordinal scales. These scales are interpreted below. First, a brief discussion of standardized codes used to denote periods of central authority interruption, collapse, or transition, that is, during periods when stable authority patterns are volatile or not politically salient is in order. When a standardized code is chosen as the most appropriate polity coding, the chosen code is applied equally to all six component variables (i.e., variables 3.1-3.6) and the three composite variables, described below (i.e., variables 3.7-3.9).
STANDARDIZED AUTHORITY CODES (−66, −77, −88)

**Interruption Periods (−66):** A score of "−66" in variables 2.1-2.8 represents a period of "interruption". Operationally, if a country is occupied by foreign powers during war, terminating the old polity, then reestablishes a polity after foreign occupation ends, Polity codes the intervening years as an interruption until an independent polity is reestablished. If foreign powers intervene during an interregnum period (−77) in order to provide assistance in re-establishing political order within the Polity, the period of the foreign intervention is coded as an interruption until a new Polity emerges and establishes independent authority. Periods of interruption are also coded for the participants involved in short-lived attempts at the creation of ethnic, religious, or regional federations.

**Interregnum Periods (−77):** A "−77" code for the Polity component variables indicates periods of “interregnum,” during which there is a complete collapse of central political authority. This is most likely to occur during periods of internal war. Lebanon between 1978 and 1986, in which internal factionalism, civil war, and external military intervention has at times reduced the scope of the regime’s central authority to a few square blocks of Beirut, is a recent example of an interregnum. During an interregnal period, all variables of authority characteristics are coded "−77". Moreover, like the "−88" and "−66" codes, a "−77" is entered for the year in which the interregnum began, regardless of the month of its origin, and for each year prior to the year in which central authority is regained or a new polity is established. Two caveats are associated with the "−77" code:

1) If the interregnal period results in the formation of a new polity, and it is less than a year, the period is usually incorporated without separate mention in the "transition period" of the next polity.

2) If a country is occupied by foreign powers during wartime, terminating the old polity, then reestablishes a polity after foreign occupation ends, the intervening years are considered an interregnum if a "new" polity is established; such cases are coded as an interruption (−66) on the case variables and noted as an interregnum on the "state failure" (SF) variable, following.

The identification of an “interregnum” period is especially important in the identification of an abrupt or disruptive regime transition, described below. Interregnal periods are equated with the collapse, or failure, of central state authority, whether or not that failure is followed by a radical transformation, or revolution, in the mode of governance. Such substantial modal transformations may not result in a substantial change in authority characteristics, e.g., Cambodia 1975, Afghanistan 1978, or Iran 1979.

**Transition Periods (−88):** A score of "−88" indicates a period of transition. Some new polities are preceded by a "transition period" during which new institutions are planned, legally constituted, and put into effect. Democratic and quasi-democratic polities are particularly likely to be so established, in a procedure involving constitutional conventions and referenda. During this period of transition, all authority characteristic indicators are scored "−88". Two examples:

1) In Argentina, after 6 years of state terrorism, economic decline and, finally, the humiliating defeat in the Falklands war, the military junta was dissolved in June 1982. Headed by retired General Bignone, the interim government established a dialogue with the major political parties and promised to hold elections in October 1983. Competitive elections were held in October and Raul Alfonsin was inaugurated in December 1983. The transitional period is the period from June, 1982, through October, 1983. However, operationally, only 1982 is coded as the transition period. Constrained by our use of an annual time-series format, transition periods are only coded if the new polity is formally established in a different year than that of the previous polity's demise. A "−88" is
entered in the year of the polity's demise rather than the year of its origin, regardless of the month in which either event occurred.

2) Cuba, in the immediate post-revolution years, demonstrates that an individual's attempt to consolidate power can also result in periods of transition. In January 1959 Fidel Castro and his rebel troops captured Santa Clara, Santiago and Havana, forcing Batista to resign and flee the country. Manuel Urrutia was named provisional president by Castro shortly thereafter. It was not until December 1961 that Castro declared himself a Marxist-Leninist and announced the formation of a unified party to bring communism to Cuba. Thus, 1959 and 1960 are coded as transitional years.

When using the "–88" code, the question of whether a substantially new polity has been formed must be decided before dealing with the question of when. The basic criterion for operationally determining a "polity change" is a 3-point change in either the composite DEMOC or AUTOC score. In general, the transition code should be applied sparingly and only in those cases where authority patterns are changing and those changes are not being seriously challenged. These are truly transitional polities where the implementation of generally accepted and substantially altered principles of governance is incomplete and fluid, resulting in mixed patterns that are difficult to define as either those of the old regime or those of the new regime.

COMPONENT VARIABLES

The six Polity component variables are scored according to the coding rules described below; no missing data scores are provided other than those listed above that designate special circumstances making the determination of Polity characteristics inappropriate. This does not mean to imply that Polity code determinations can be made without questionable results due to insufficient information, ambiguity, or the fluidity of political events. In all cases where coders are not able to confidently assign component variable scores well within the operational parameters of the variable’s coding rules, the annual case will be flagged as “tenuous” using the FLAG (1.5) variable above.

COMPONENT VARIABLES: Executive Recruitment (vars. 3.1 to 3.3)
(See also, variable 3.7 below and Addendum A: Executive Recruitment Concepts)

According to Eckstein and Gurr, "Executive recruitment involves the ways in which superordinates come to occupy their positions...In current sociological jargon this is a species of "boundary interchange," a matter of crossing lines between superordinate and subordinate positions. (Eckstein and Gurr 1975,150)

The Polity IV dataset contains three indicators of the structural characteristics by which chief executives are recruited: (1) the extent of institutionalization of executive transfers, XRREG; (2) the competitiveness of executive selection, XRCOMP; and (3) the openness of executive recruitment, XROPEN.

3.1 XRREG (all versions)
Regulation of Chief Executive Recruitment: In considering recruitment, we must first determine whether there are any established modes at all by which chief executives are selected. Regulation refers to the extent to which a polity has institutionalized procedures for transferring executive power. Three categories are used to differentiate the extent of institutionalization:
(1) Unregulated: Changes in chief executive occur through forceful seizures of power. Such caesaristic transfers of power are sometimes legitimized after the fact in noncompetitive elections or by legislative enactment. Despite these "legitimization" techniques, a polity remains unregulated until the de facto leader of the coup has been replaced as head of government either by designative or competitive modes of executive selection. However, unregulated recruitment does not include the occasional forceful ouster of a chief executive if elections are called within a reasonable time and the previous pattern continues.

(2) Designational/Transitional: Chief executives are chosen by designation within the political elite, without formal competition (i.e., one-party systems or "rigged" multiparty elections). Also coded here are transitional arrangements intended to regularize future power transitions after an initial unregulated seizure of power (i.e., after constitutional legitimation of military rule or during periods when the leader of the coup steps down as head of state but retains unrivaled power within the political realm as head of the military). This category also includes polities in transition from designative to elective modes of executive selection (i.e., the period of "guided democracy" often exhibited during the transition from military to civilian rule) or vice versa (i.e., regimes ensuring electoral victory through the intimidation of oppositional leaders or the promulgation of a "state of emergency" before executive elections).

(3) Regulated: Chief executives are determined by hereditary succession or in competitive elections. Ascriptive/designative and ascriptive/elective selections (i.e., an effective king and premier) are also coded as regulated. The fundamental difference between regulated selection and unregulated recruitment is that regulated structures require the existence of institutionalized modes of executive recruitment, either through constitutional decree or lineage. Moreover, in regulated competitive systems, unlike the designational/transitional mode, the method of future executive selection is not dependent on the particular party or regime currently holding power.

3.2 XRCOMP (all versions)
Competitiveness of Executive Recruitment: Competitiveness refers to the extent that prevailing modes of advancement give subordinates equal opportunities to become superordinates (Gurr 1974, 1483)." For example, selection of chief executives through popular elections matching two or more viable parties or candidates is regarded as competitive. If power transfers are coded Unregulated ("1") in the Regulation of Executive Recruitment (variable 3.1), or involve a transition to/from unregulated, Competitiveness is coded "0". Three categories are used to measure this concept:

(1) Selection: Chief executives are determined by hereditary succession, designation, or by a combination of both, as in monarchies whose chief minister is chosen by king or court. Examples of pure designative selection are rigged, unopposed elections; repeated replacement of presidents before their terms end; recurrent military selection of civilian executives; selection within an institutionalized single party; recurrent incumbent selection of successors; repeated election boycotts by the major opposition parties, etc.

(2) Dual/Transitional: Dual executives in which one is chosen by hereditary succession, the other by competitive election. Also used for transitional arrangements between selection (ascription and/or designation) and competitive election.
(3) **Election:** Chief executives are typically chosen in or through competitive elections matching two or more major parties or candidates. (Elections may be popular or by an elected assembly.)

### 3.3 XROPEN (all versions)

Openness of Executive Recruitment: Recruitment of the chief executive is "open" to the extent that all the politically active population has an opportunity, in principle, to attain the position through a regularized process. If power transfers are coded Unregulated (1) in the Regulation of Executive Recruitment (variable 3.1), or involve a transition to/from Unregulated, Openness is coded 0. Four categories are used:

1. **Closed:** Chief executives are determined by hereditary succession, e.g. kings, emperors, beys, emirs, etc. who assume executive powers by right of descent. **An executive selected by other means may proclaim himself a monarch but the polity he governs is not coded "closed" unless a relative actually succeeds him as ruler.**

2. **Dual Executive–Designation:** Hereditary succession plus executive or court selection of an effective chief minister.

3. **Dual Executive–Election:** Hereditary succession plus electoral selection of an effective chief minister.

4. **Open:** Chief executives are chosen by elite designation, competitive election, or transitional arrangements between designation and election.

Some examples may clarify the coding scheme outlined above. The Soviet Union's (XRREG/XRCOMP/XROPEN) profile on these variables, since the accession of Khrushchev, is Designational/Selection/Open. Victorian Britain's profile was Regulated/Transitional/Dual Executive–Election, whereas contemporary Britain, along with other modern democracies, is coded Regulated/Election/Open. The polities of leaders who seize power by force are coded Unregulated, but there is a recurring impulse among such leaders to regularize the process of succession, usually by relying on some form of selection. A less common variant, as in modern Iran and Nicaragua under the Somozas, is one in which a Caesaristic leader attempts to establish the principle of hereditary succession. **Polity codes all such attempts at regularizing succession as Transitional (under Regulation, variable 3.1) until the first chief executive chosen under the new rules takes office.**

A translation of the conceptualizations of executive recruitment used in Polity IV into the component coding scheme outlined above is presented in Table 3.1.
Table 3.1. Translation of Polity IV Executive Recruitment Concepts and Component Variables
(See variable 3.7 below and Addendum A)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Polity IV Concept</th>
<th>Brief Description</th>
<th>Polity IV Component Variables</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(1) Ascription</td>
<td>Succession by birthright</td>
<td>XRREG (Regulated 3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>XRCOMP (Selection 1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>XOROPEN (Closed 1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2) Dual Executive: Ascription + Designation</td>
<td>Ascriptive and designated rulers co-exist</td>
<td>XRREG (Regulated 3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>XRCOMP (Selection 1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>XOROPEN (Dual–Des. 2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(3) Designation</td>
<td>Informal competition within an elite</td>
<td>XRREG (Transition 2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>XRCOMP (Selection 1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>XOROPEN (Open 4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(4) Self-Selection</td>
<td>Self-selection by seizure of power</td>
<td>XRREG (Unregulated 1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>XRCOMP (Not App. 0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>XOROPEN (Not App. 0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(5) Gradual Transition from Self-Selection</td>
<td></td>
<td>XRREG (Transition 2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>XRCOMP (Not app. 0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>XOROPEN (Not app. 0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(6) Dual Executive: Ascription + Election</td>
<td>Ascriptive and elective rulers co-exist</td>
<td>XRREG (Regulated 3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>XRCOMP (Transition 2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>XOROPEN (Dual–Elec. 3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(7) Transitional or Restricted Election</td>
<td>Formal competition among publicly supported candidates</td>
<td>XRREG (Transition 2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>XRCOMP (Transition 2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>XOROPEN (Open 4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(8) Competitive Election</td>
<td></td>
<td>XRREG (Regulated 3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>XRCOMP (Election 3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>XOROPEN (Open 4)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

COMPONENT VARIABLES: The Independence of Executive Authority (var 3.4)
(See also, variable 3.8 below and Addendum B: Executive Constraints Concepts)

One of the key characteristics of authority patterns is the extent to which the head of the unit (in states, the chief executive ruler) must take into account the preferences of others when making decisions. According to Eckstein and Gurr: "There is an important qualitative difference in responsiveness that is analogous to the distinction between sufferance and suffrage. In some authority patterns the supers are obliged to incorporate some preferences of subordinates into decisions, in others they need only consider them. Most ruling Communist parties follow the latter pattern: there are regular (even if limited) opportunities for party members to express their views on matters of party policy, but ordinary members seldom are empowered to make choices among alternative policies. Most political parties in Western democracies, and some labor unions, have institutionalized the provision of choice for at least some kinds of policies." (Eckstein and Gurr 1975, 381)

The Polity IV dataset incorporates one relevant characteristic of Responsiveness: the magnitude to which decision rules constrain the executives actions (a second characteristic,
MONO–Monocratism: the extent to which the chief executive is dependent either formally or informally for his position on a cabinet, council or junta, has been dropped from the data).

3.4 XCONST (all versions)

Executive Constraints (Decision Rules): According to Eckstein and Gurr, decision rules are defined in the following manner: "Superordinate structures in action make decisions concerning the direction of social units. Making such decisions requires that supers and subs be able to recognize when decision-processes have been concluded, especially "properly" concluded. An indispensable ingredient of the processes, therefore, is the existence of Decision Rules that provide basic criteria under which decisions are considered to have been taken." (Eckstein and Gurr 1975, 121)

Operationally, this variable refers to the extent of institutionalized constraints on the decision-making powers of chief executives, whether individuals or collectivities. Such limitations may be imposed by any "accountability groups." In Western democracies these are usually legislatures. Other kinds of accountability groups are the ruling party in a one-party state; councils of nobles or powerful advisors in monarchies; the military in coup-prone polities; and in many states a strong, independent judiciary. The concern is therefore with the checks and balances between the various parts of the decision-making process. A seven-category scale is used.

(1) Unlimited Authority: There are no regular limitations on the executive's actions (as distinct from irregular limitations such as the threat or actuality of coups and assassinations). Examples of evidence:
   i. Constitutional restrictions on executive action are ignored.
   ii. Constitution is frequently revised or suspended at the executive's initiative.
   iii. There is no legislative assembly, or there is one but it is called and dismissed at the executive's pleasure.
   iv. The executive appoints a majority of members of any accountability group and can remove them at will.
   v. The legislature cannot initiate legislation or veto or suspend acts of the executive.
   vi. Rule by decree is repeatedly used.

Note 3.4: If the executive is given limited or unlimited power by a legislature to cope with an emergency and relents this power after the emergency has passed, this is not a change to unlimited authority.

(2) Intermediate Category

(3) Slight to Moderate Limitation on Executive Authority: There are some real but limited restraints on the executive. Evidence:
   i. The legislature initiates some categories of legislation.
   ii. The legislature blocks implementation of executive acts and decrees.
   iii. Attempts by the executive to change some constitutional restrictions, such as prohibitions on succeeding himself, or extending his term, fail and are not adopted.
   iv. The ruling party initiates some legislation or takes some administrative action independently of the executive.
   v. The legislature or party approves some categories of appointments nominated by the executive.
   vi. There is an independent judiciary.
vii. Situations in which there exists a civilian executive, but in which policy decisions, for all practical purposes, reflect the demands of the military.

(4) Intermediate Category

(5) Substantial Limitations on Executive Authority: The executive has more effective authority than any accountability group but is subject to substantial constraints by them. Examples:
   i. A legislature or party council often modifies or defeats executive proposals for action.
   ii. A council or legislature sometimes refuses funds to the executive.
   iii. The accountability group makes important appointments to administrative posts.
   iv. The legislature refuses the executive permission to leave the country.

(6) Intermediate Category

(7) Executive Parity or Subordination: Accountability groups have effective authority equal to or greater than the executive in most areas of activity. Examples of evidence:
   i. A legislature, ruling party, or council of nobles initiates much or most important legislation.
   ii. The executive (president, premier, king, cabinet, council) is chosen by the accountability group and is dependent on its continued support to remain in office (as in most parliamentary systems).
   iii. In multi-party democracies, there is chronic "cabinet instability."

COMPONENT VARIABLES: Political Competition and Opposition (vars 3.5 and 3.6)
(See also variable 3.9 below and Addendum C: Political Competition Concepts)

A third general authority trait of polities is participation. As Eckstein and Gurr defined participation, it involves the following: "[s]ubordinates need not be merely Passive recipients of direction, and they seldom are. Some of them generally attempt to influence the directive activities of supers. Acts by which subs attempt to wield such influence are acts of participation." (Eckstein and Gurr 1975, 60)

The operational question is the extent to which the political system enables non-elites to influence political elites in regular ways. The Polity IV dataset measures this concept in two ways: (1) by the degree of institutionalization or "regulation" of political participation, and (2) by the extent of government restriction on political competition.

3.5 PARREG (all versions)
Regulation of Participation: Participation is regulated to the extent that there are binding rules on when, whether, and how political preferences are expressed. One-party states and Western democracies both regulate participation but they do so in different ways, the former by channeling participation through a single party structure, with sharp limits on diversity of opinion; the latter by allowing relatively stable and enduring groups to compete nonviolently for political influence. The polar opposite is unregulated participation, in which there are no enduring national political organizations and no effective regime controls on political activity. In such situations political
competition is fluid and often characterized by recurring coercion among shifting coalitions of partisan groups. A five-category scale is used to code this dimension:

1. **Unregulated**: Political participation is fluid; there are no enduring national political organizations and no systematic regime controls on political activity. Political groupings tend to form around particular leaders, regional interests, religious or ethnic or clan groups, etc.; but the number and relative importance of such groups in national political life varies substantially over time.

2. **Multiple Identity**: There are relatively stable and enduring political groups which compete for political influence at the national level—parties, regional groups, or ethnic groups, not necessarily elected—but there are few, recognized overlapping (common) interests.

3. **Sectarian**: Political demands are characterized by incompatible interests and intransigent posturing among multiple identity groups and oscillate more or less regularly between intense factionalism and government favoritism, that is, when one identity group secures central power it favors group members in central allocations and restricts competing groups' political activities, until it is displaced in turn (i.e., active factionalism). Also coded here are polities in which political groups are based on restricted membership and significant portions of the population historically have been excluded from access to positions of power (latent factionalism, e.g., indigenous peoples in some South American countries).

4. **Restricted**: Some organized political participation is permitted without intense factionalism but significant groups, issues, and/or types of conventional participation are regularly excluded from the political process.

5. **Regulated**: Relatively stable and enduring political groups regularly compete for political influence and positions with little use of coercion. No significant groups, issues, or types of conventional political action are regularly excluded from the political process.

### 3.6 PARCOMP (all versions)

The Competitiveness of Participation: The competitiveness of participation refers to the extent to which alternative preferences for policy and leadership can be pursued in the political arena. **Political competition implies a significant degree of civil interaction**, so polities which are coded Unregulated (1) on Regulation of Participation (PARREG, variable 2.5) are not coded for competitiveness. Polities in transition between Unregulated and any of the regulated forms on variable 2.5 also are not coded on variable 2.6. Competitiveness is coded on a five-category scale:

1. **Not Applicable**: This is used for polities that are coded as Unregulated, or moving to/from that position, in Regulation of Political Participation (variable 2.6).

2. **Repressed**: No significant oppositional activity is permitted outside the ranks of the regime and ruling party. Totalitarian party systems, authoritarian military dictatorships, and despotic monarchies are typically coded here. However, the mere existence of these structures is not sufficient for a Repressed coding. The regime's institutional structure must also be matched by its demonstrated ability to repress oppositional competition.
(2) Suppressed: Some organized, political competition occurs outside government, without serious factionalism; but the regime systematically and sharply limits its form, extent, or both in ways that exclude substantial groups (20% or more of the adult population) from participation. Suppressed competition is distinguished from Factional competition (below) by the systematic, persisting nature of the restrictions: large classes of people, groups, or types of peaceful political competition are continuously excluded from the political process. As an operational rule, the banning of a political party which received more than 10% of the vote in a recent national election is sufficient evidence that competition is "suppressed." However, other information is required to determine whether the appropriate coding is (2) Suppressed or (3) Factional competition. This category is also used to characterize transitions between Factional and Repressed competition. Examples of "suppression" are:

i. Prohibiting some kinds of political organizations, either by type or group of people involved (e.g., no national political parties or no ethnic political organizations).

ii. Prohibiting some kinds of political action (e.g., Communist parties may organize but are prohibited from competing in elections).

iii. Systematic harassment of political opposition (leaders killed, jailed, or sent into exile; candidates regularly ruled off ballots; opposition media banned, etc.). This is evidence for either Factional, Suppressed, or Repressed, depending on the nature of the regime, the opposition, and the persistence of political groups.

Note 3.6: A newly enacted right to engage in political activities is most likely a change from category 1 to 2.

(3) Factional: Polities with parochial or ethnic-based political factions that regularly compete for political influence in order to promote particularist agendas and favor group members to the detriment of common, secular, or cross-cutting agendas.

(4) Transitional: Any transitional arrangement from Restricted, Suppressed, or Factional patterns to fully Competitive patterns, or vice versa. Transitional arrangements are accommodative of competing, parochial interests but have not fully linked parochial with broader, general interests. Sectarian and secular interest groups coexist.

(5) Competitive: There are relatively stable and enduring, secular political groups which regularly compete for political influence at the national level; ruling groups and coalitions regularly, voluntarily transfer central power to competing groups. Competition among groups seldom involves coercion or disruption. Small parties or political groups may be restricted in the Competitive pattern.

By combining scores on Regulation of Political Participation (variable 3.5) and the Competitiveness of Participation (variable 3.6), a relatively detailed picture of the extent of political competition and opposition emerges. A translation of the Polity IV conceptual categories of political competition into the component coding scheme described here is presented in Table 3.2.
Table 3.2. Translation of Polity IV Political Competition Concepts and Component Variables
(See variable 3.8 below and Addendum C)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Polity IV Concept</th>
<th>Polity IV Component Variables</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PARREG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1) Suppressed</td>
<td>Restricted (4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2) Restricted</td>
<td>Restricted (4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(3) Imposed Transition: Loosening or tightening restrictions</td>
<td>Sectarian (3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(4) Uninstitutionalized</td>
<td>Unregulated (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(5) Gradual Transition from Uninstitutionalized</td>
<td>Multiple Identity (2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(6) Factional/Restricted</td>
<td>Sectarian (3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(7) Factional</td>
<td>Multiple Identity (2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(8) Electoral Transition: Persistent Conflict/Coercion</td>
<td>Sectarian (3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(9) Electoral Transition: Limited Conflict/Coercion</td>
<td>Multiple Identity (2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(10) Institutionalized Electoral</td>
<td>Regulated (5)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

CONCEPT VARIABLES (vars. 3.7-3.9)
Polity IV Concept Variables present an alternative approach for assessing and understanding the authority characteristics of polities. The original Polity I coding scheme emphasized authority typologies in three categories: executive recruitment, executive constraints, and political competition. The Polity II coding scheme introduced the more detailed, component scheme (see variables 3.1-3.6 above). Polity IV includes information based on both schemes as these alternative perspectives complement one another to facilitate coding and comprehension. Detailed coding guidelines for the application of Polity IV Concept Variables are provided in Addendums A, B, and C, following.

3.7 EXREC (all versions)
Executive Recruitment: Concept variable combines information presented in three component variables: XRREG, XRCOMP, and XROPEN (see variables 3.1-3.3 and Table 3.1 above). Executive Recruitment concepts represent an alternative method for comprehending authority patterns and are explained in detail in Addendum A.
3.8 EXCONST (all versions)
Executive Constraints: Concept variable is identical to XCONST (variable 3.4) above. See Addendum B for detailed explanations of the codes used.

3.9 POLCOMP (all versions)
Political Competition: Concept variable combines information presented in two component variables: PARREG and PARCOMP (see variables 3.5 and 3.6 and Table 3.2 above). Political Competition concepts represent an alternative method for comprehending authority patterns and are explained in detail in Addendum C.

4. Polity Regime Transitions

A new section was added to the Polity data series in order to combine polity change, or transition, information in the annual time-series format. As such, the following discussion pertains mainly to versions p4 and p4e. Version p4d is structured in accordance with changes in regime authority characteristics to facilitate persistence and transition analyses. Version p4d includes only the date of change information described in this section.

Variables in Section 4 are coded whenever there has been a change in coded regime authority characteristics on any of the six component variables, whether or not that change accounts for a change in the overall POLITY score. In many cases of Polity regime change, the end date of the previous Polity will coincide with the begin date of the subsequent Polity, however, in order to keep the Polity records discreet, such changes will be denoted by consecutive “end” and “begin” dates. In other cases, the end date of a polity will be followed by a transitory period while new authority patterns are established, thus warranting a Standardized Authority Code that begins with the end date of the earlier Polity (i.e., a Standardized Authority Code is not considered a Polity and, so, no BDATE is assigned). In some cases, multiple Polity changes in the same general direction (either toward greater democratic or autocratic authority patterns) may occur sequentially within a single calendar year or over the course of more than one year; in those cases, there will be an INTERIM period between the end date of one Polity and the begin date of the next. NOTE: Regimes lasting less than one year are not considered institutionalized Polities and, so, are only denoted when they are part of a sequential Polity change.

The section 4 record for a single year regime transition or for the final year of a multi-year regime authority transition or change, denoted by a “1” in the flag variable D4, is the Polity transition record. This data record includes the POLITY score of the previous authority regime (PRIOR), the end date of the previous authority regime (EYEAR and EDATE), the most recent INTERIM score, the begin date of the new authority regime (BYEAR and BDATE), the POLITY score for the new authority regime (POST), the polity change score over the entire transition period (CHANGE), and the regime transition category code (REGTRANS). Previous years of a multi-year regime authority transition or change will record information regarding incremental changes. All transition year records in a multi-year transition record are coded “0” on the CHANGE variable, except for years coded as an interregnum (-77) or an interruption (-66) on the final day of the record year; these annual records will be coded with the appropriate Standard Authority Code (-77 or -66). In addition, any annual Polity record during which an interregnum (-77) is recorded at any time during the year will be denoted with a value of “1” on the flag variable SF.
The original Polity I dataset used a polity-case format to study polity persistence and change. In that format, “polity” is equated with “regime,” such that a new polity begins or an old polity ends when there is an abrupt and substantial change in governing authority characteristics. Polity II adopted the present country-year format; in this format, “polity” acts as a conceptual link between “state” and “regime.” The country-year (time-series) format makes the Polity data compatible with many other data resources for complex, comparative analyses, however, a large measure of precision is lost. In studying the relationship between polity changes and political events, it may be important to be able to note whether the change happened prior to, coincident with, or subsequent to a related event. Polity IIIId returned to the original structure with the “polity” as the unit of analysis, except that new “polities” were not distinguished exogenously (i.e., by reference to fundamental differences between the new and the replaced polity) but, rather, endogenously, by reference to distinct changes in a state’s mode of governance. That is, Polity IIIId set a lower threshold for identifying changes in polities; this gives the data consumer more flexibility in polity research. The new “polity-case” version, Polity IVd, uses the same minimal standard for change as Polity I and Polity IIIId. However, small changes in coded values are too closely associated with the “confidence interval” inherent with the articulation and application of coding guidelines. Using a somewhat higher threshold will increase the level of confidence in the consistency of polity change identification.

The original Polity guidelines for identifying regime changes were particularly convoluted (covering three pages in the Polity II codebook); several of the Polity II variables later abandoned by Polity III were among the variables that had been used to identify regime changes. A large part of the reason for abandoning the variables was their inherent subjectivity and the difficulty of applying the coding rules consistently, especially in regard to historical cases. The new Polity II variables also drifted away from the original Polity I focus on institutionalized authority patterns by incorporating information on state power, organized political conflict, and civil warfare. Polity III’s abandonment of non-authority variables marked a discontinuity in the identification of “polity transformations.” Polity IIIId represents an “out-of-house” attempt to refocus the concept and identification of “polity change” using only authority criteria.

In reexamining “in-house” cases of “abrupt or disruptive regime transitions” for the period 1955-1998, it became clear that case selection was not based solely on changes in regime authority characteristics. Case selection was confounded by the role of violence in regime change. As an important application of the Polity data is assessing the nature of the relationship between authority structures and conflict dynamics, case selection criteria must be independent from civil conflict events. Polity IV uses a case selection standard that is defined completely within the conceptual boundaries of the original Polity authority characteristics framework.

Polity IV adopts as its basic threshold value a 3-point change in the POLITY variable (i.e., DEMOC – AUTOC, see above), with each continuous, sequential change (in the same general direction) in a complex transition occurring within three years or less of the previous change; this criteria defines a “regime transition” (denoted with a non-zero value on the REGTRANS variable and a flag value “1” on the D4 variable; this combination will appear in the final year record of a multi-year transition ). This standard signifies a substantive, normative change in political authority considered sufficient to present real opportunities for regime opponents to challenge the, as yet, non-institutionalized authority of the polity. As such, the “regime transition” standard is used to define the ending of an established polity and the beginning of a new polity and provides a measure of the vulnerability and durability (i.e., persistence) of a particular regime and its authority patterns. Polity durability
is measured as the number of years that have lapsed since the last regime transition or the (re)establishment of a polity following an interruption, interregnum, or transition period (Standard Authority Codes “–66”, “–77”, or “–88”; see DURABLE, variable 2.4 above).

Polity IV has also adopted a higher threshold for identifying an “adverse regime change,” that is, a distinct break or discontinuity in institutionalized political authority patterns. This higher standard has four components as follows: (1) a six-point or greater decrease in the combined POLITY score (DEMOC-AUTOC) over a period of three years or less; (2) a collapse of central state authority, designated in Polity as an “interregnum” and denoted by the Standardized Authority Code “–77”; (3) a revolutionary transformation in the mode of governing authority that is necessarily preceded by a collapse of the central state authority (interregnum) of the earlier regime and denoted by the Standardized Authority Code “–77; and (4) the dissolution and territorial reconfiguration of a state that is not accepted by the extant regime and, so, must necessarily involve the collapse of the extant regime’s central authority. Similarly, Polity IV denotes cases of “major democratic transition” defined by a six-point or greater increase in the combined POLITY score.

4.1 PRIOR (p4 only)
Prior Polity Code: Regime POLITY code immediately prior to the regime EDATE denoting a regime change in the target YEAR or the beginning year in a multi-year regime change. The PRIOR code may be a number from –10 to 10 or it “begin state” code (88 or 99); it may not be a standardized authority code (i.e., –66, –77, or –88) as those are necessarily transitory conditions, not polities. The PRIOR code and the corresponding EYEAR and EDATE of the initial polity change (i.e., the first year record) in a multi-year regime change is repeated in the record of the final year of the multi-year change. This has been done to facilitate retrieval of information concerning the beginning and ending polities in multi-year regime changes, particularly when the D3 “flag” variable is used to select regime transition cases out of the larger dataset (see variable 4.11, below).

4.2 EMONTH (all versions)
Polity End Month: Two-digit number denoting the ending month of the previous polity (p4 and p4e) or the ending month of the current polity case (p4d). In the p4 and p4e versions, the polity end date signifies the end of a previous regime and the beginning of a regime change. In the p4d version, the end date denotes the end of the current case record; the present regime (PRESENT=1) is coded “99.”

4.3 EDAY (all versions)
Polity End Day: Two-digit number denoting the ending day of the previous polity (p4 and p4e) or the ending day of the current polity case (p4d). In the p4 and p4e versions, the polity end date signifies the end of a previous regime and the beginning of a regime change. In the p4d version, the end date denotes the end of the current case record; the present regime (PRESENT=1) is coded “99.”

4.4 EYEAR (all versions)
Polity End Year: Four-digit number denoting the ending year of the previous polity (p4 and p4e) or the ending year of the current polity case (p4d). In the p4 and p4e versions, the polity end date signifies the end of a previous regime and the beginning of a regime change. In the p4d version, the end date denotes the end of the current case record; the present regime (PRESENT=1) is coded “9999.”
4.5 EPREC (p4 only)
End Date Precision: Precision level of end date, EDATE, coding:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Label</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Exact Date</td>
<td>Used when the exact date of the polity start could be identified.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Assigned Date</td>
<td>Used where more than one event could be attributed to the change leading to polity start, or the event persisted for more than one day, or the Polity coders were uncertain whether or not the particular event identified was indeed the source of the change in political structure identified by earlier versions of the data.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Approximate Date</td>
<td>Used if the month of the polity start could be identified, but not a specific day. In these cases, the polity is assumed to start on the 16th day of the month.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Missing Date</td>
<td>Used if the year of the polity start could be identified/were coded in Polity II, but not a specific day and month. In these cases, the polity is assumed to start on July 1 (i.e., 0701)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>No EPREC code was recorded for dates in 1995-98</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4.6 INTERIM (p4 only)
Interim Polity Code: Interim Polity coding is used to denote (1) the short-lived nature of a distinct change in regime authority that spans only a portion of the coded year (i.e., a POLITY code) that would not otherwise be recorded due to the annualized structure of the Polity data, (2) a “transition” period of three years or less while a new Polity is being established (i.e., –88 code), (3) an “interruption” period of any length while a Polity remains under foreign authority (i.e., –66 code), or (4) an “interregnal” period denoting a collapse of central authority (i.e., –77 code). INTERIM is coded for each year between the end date (EDATE) of the previous Polity and the begin date (BDATE) of the subsequent Polity whenever standardized authority codes are used or when a series of incremental changes over a period of three years or less combine for a consistent POLITY change of three points or more (“consistent” here means that the incremental changes are all in the same general direction, positive or negative).

4.7 BMONTH (all versions)
Polity Begin Month: Two-digit number denoting the beginning month of the next, or “post” polity (p4 and p4e) or the beginning month of the current polity case (p4d). In the p4 and p4e versions, the polity begin date signifies the beginning of a new regime and the ending of a regime change. In the p4d version, the begin date denotes the beginning of the current case record.

4.8 BDAY (all versions)
Polity Begin Day: Two-digit number denoting the beginning day of the next, or “post” polity (p4 and p4e) or the beginning day of the current polity case (p4d). In the p4 and p4e versions, the polity begin date signifies the beginning of a new regime and the ending of a regime change. In the p4d version, the begin date denotes the beginning of the current case record.
4.9 **BYEAR** 9 (all versions)
Polity Begin Year: Four-digit number denoting the beginning year of the next, or “post” polity (p4 and p4e) or the beginning year of the current polity case (p4d). In the p4 and p4e versions, the polity begin date signifies the beginning of a new regime and the ending of a regime change. In the p4d version, the begin date denotes the beginning of the current case record.

4.10 **BPREC** (p4 only)
Begin Date Precision: Precision level of begin date, BDATE, coding

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Label</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Exact Date</td>
<td>Used when the exact date of the polity start could be identified.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Assigned Date</td>
<td>Used where more than one event could be attributed to the change leading to polity start, or the event persisted for more than one day, or the Polity coders were uncertain whether or not the particular event identified was indeed the source of the change in political structure identified by earlier versions of the data.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Approximate Date</td>
<td>Used if the month of the polity start could be identified, but not a specific day. In these cases, the polity is assumed to start on the 16th day of the month.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Missing Date</td>
<td>Used if the year of the polity start could be identified/were coded in Polity II, but not a specific day and month. In these cases, the polity is assumed to start on July 1 (i.e., 0701)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>No BPREC code was recorded for dates in 1995-98</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4.9 **POST** (p4 only)
Post Polity Code: Regime POLITY code immediately after to the regime BDATE denoting a regime change in the target YEAR. The POST code may only be a POLITY code (see variable 2.3 above). **Note:** POST will be the same as POLITY for that year (except in cases of interruption, interregnum, or transition, when there is not yet a POST Polity established). POST and PRIOR are used to facilitate identification of regime transitions.

4.10 **CHANGE** (p4 only)
Total change in POLITY value: Net difference between PRIOR (the last recorded POLITY value) and POST (new) polity values across a continuous polity change (i.e., less than three years between substantive changes in an exclusively positive or negative direction). CHANGE may range from a positive extreme of 20 (i.e., a change from full autocracy to full democracy) to a negative extreme of -20 (i.e., a change from full democracy to full autocracy). Standardized authority codes for interruptions, transitions, or interregnums (i.e., −66, −77, or −88) are not considered Polity codes; they may only be INTERIM codes. As both interruptions (foreign occupation) and interregnums (anarchy or anti-polity) are discontinuities in the regime transition process, these conditions are noted on the CHANGE variable in the year when the interruption or interregnum code first appears and thereafter, until a new polity is established or a transition (−88) to a new polity is initiated. When a “−88” INTERIM code is used, CHANGE is coded “0” for each interim, or transition, year. CHANGE is calculated as the difference between the PRIOR score of the regime immediately preceding the
transition period and the POST score of the newly established regime (i.e., the new Polity). The year of a regime change, or the final year of a multi-year regime change, is designated by a code “1” on the flag variable D3 (see below).

(–66) Authority Interruption: A “–66” code is recorded in the initial year of an interruption of political authority by an intervening foreign power (or a short-lived federation of states) and “–66” for each subsequent year of collapse until a new polity is established or a transition (–88) to a new polity is initiated.

(–77) Authority Collapse: A “–77” code is recorded in the initial year of a collapse of central state authority (i.e., state failure) and “–77” for each subsequent year of collapse until a new polity is established or a transition (–88) to a new polity or foreign interruption (–66) is initiated.

(0) Polity in Transition: A “0” code is recorded for all years during a multi-year regime authority transition or change except the final year of transition (i.e., the first year of the new polity).

(–20 to 20) Polity Change Score: A number between 20 and –20 is recorded in the final year of a regime authority transition or change to denote the difference between the POLITY value of the previous regime (PRIOR) and that of the new regime (POST). The section 4 record in the final year of a regime authority transition or change includes the POLITY score of the previous authority regime (PRIOR), the end date of the previous authority regime (EYEAR and EDATE), the most recent INTERIM score, the begin date of the new authority regime (BYEAR and BDATE), the POLITY score for the new authority regime (POST), the polity change score over the entire transition period (CHANGE), and the regime transition category code (REGTRANS).

(88) Pre-existing Polity: A “88” code is recorded for the beginning year of the dataset record (i.e., 1800) to denote that the Polity was established prior to 1800.

(96) State Disintegration: A “96” code is recorded to denote the end of a Polity record when the territorial dimensions (and borders) of a state are substantially changed due to a disputed disintegration of administrative units and the appearance of newly independent successor states. State disintegration is considered a collapse of central state authority and, so, the variable SF is coded “1” for the final year record of the Polity.

(97) State Transformation: A “97” code is recorded to denote the beginning of a Polity record when the territorial dimensions (and borders) of a state are substantially changed such that a new state formed that is substantially different from the old state and new state codes are assigned. In cases of state transformation, there is continuity between the authority regime of the old Polity and the new Polity (i.e., the old authority regime assumes authority in the new state), for example, North Vietnam (DRV) for united Vietnam (VIE). For the purpose of tracking Polity changes, transformed Polities are assumed to be continuous with the former Polity and any changes in authority characteristics begun during the previous Polity are included with the transition information for the new Polity.
State Demise: A “98” code is recorded to denote the demise of a state and the ending of its Polity record due to its voluntary dissolution (e.g., Czechoslovakia–CZE) or its incorporation in another state (e.g., South Vietnam–RVN–in the united Vietnam–VIE).

State Creation: A “99” code is recorded in the year of state independence or formation.

4.11 D4 (p4 only)
Regime Transition Completed. Variable D4 is a flag variable that designates (by code “1”) the year of a regime change or the final year of a multi-year regime transition. This flag variable is included to facilitate data transformation to a “regime persistence and change” (i.e., Polity IIIId type) format. For the flagged year, the PRIOR code and the end date information are those of the initial change for a multi-year transition period. As such, the full POLITY change and transition period parameters are recorded in the (final) transition year’s annual record. Using the D3 variable to select regime transition information will transform the data from an annual record format to a Polity record format.

4.12 SF (p4 only)
State Failure. Variable SF is a flag variable that designates (by code “1”) every year during which a Polity is considered to be in a condition of “complete collapse of central authority” or “state failure” (i.e., -77). The variable SF is also coded “1” for years when a state disintegrates (variable CHANGE code “96”) and when a profound revolutionary change in political authority occurs (during which the authority of the previous Polity is assumed to have collapsed completely prior to the revolutionary seizure of power and subsequent restructuring of authority). Using the SF variable to select regime information will facilitate identification of periods of state failure.

4.13 REGTRANS (p4 only)
Regime Transition: The Polity has undergone a substantive regime transition, defined as a “regime change.” A “regime change” is defined simply as a three-point change in either the polity’s DEMOC or AUTOC score and may be either a negative value change (i.e., “negative regime change” or “adverse regime transition”) or a positive value change (i.e., “positive regime change,” “minor democratic transition,” or “major democratic transition”). An “adverse regime transition” is defined as a six-point decrease in the polity’s POLITY score or by an interregnal period ( -77) that denotes a collapse of central authority or a revolutionary transformation in the mode of governance. A “democratic transition” is defined as at least a three-point POLITY value change in three years or less from autocracy (i.e., a negative or zero POLITY score) to a partial democracy (POLITY values +1 to +6) or full democracy (POLITY values +7 to +10). The REGTRANS value is coded according to the CHANGE value assigned for a continuous regime transition; REGTRANS records the same value for each year in a multi-year regime transition (i.e., from the last recoded POLITY prior to transition to the establishment of a new Polity). Each year of a regime transition has a recorded value from 3 to -2; this method is used to facilitate the isolation of regime transition data from the full data record. The REGTRANS variable is coded according to the following scale:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>+3</td>
<td>Major Democratic Transition – six points or greater increase in POLITY score over a period of three years or less including a shift from an autocratic POLITY value ( -10 to 0) to a partial democratic POLITY value (+1 to +6) or full democratic POLITY value (+7 to +10) or a shift from a partial democratic value to a full democratic value.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
+2  Minor Democratic Transition – three to five point increase in POLITY score over a period of three years or less including a shift from autocratic to partial democratic or from partial to full democratic value (see definitions above).
+1  Positive Regime Change – three or more point increase in POLITY score without a shift in regime type as defined above.
0 Little or No Change in POLITY score.
-1  Negative Regime Change – three to five point decrease in POLITY score.
-2  Adverse Regime Transition – six or more point decrease in POLITY score or an interregnal period (~77) denoting a collapse of central state authority or a revolutionary transformation in the mode of governance (not a democratic transition).
-77  State Failure – complete collapse of central political authority

Special Auxiliary Codes (see 4.10 CHANGE for a description of values):
-66  Interruption
96  State Disintegration
97  State Transformation
98  State Demise
99  State Creation

5. Polity II Variables No Longer Supported
These Polity II variables are not included in the Polity IV dataset; variable descriptions in this section are included for your information only.

REGION: Region Code

CONCEN: Concentration of Power
We regard the concentration of power in the hands of state authorities to be analytically and functionally distinct from democracy and autocracy. The typical nineteenth century autocracy exercised less effective control over its subjects than the typical activist welfare democracy of the late twentieth century. "Power" has many meanings, two of which can be indexed more or less directly using the POLITY II dataset. SCOPE is a measure of the extent to which the state uses its powers of regulation and command to direct social and economic activity. An alternative measure of power concentration is based on the institutional characteristics of the polity. Institutional power is least in polities where political competition is divisive and unregulated, where political authority is dispersed among different individuals and institutions, and where peripheral regions have some autonomy form central authority. The opposite traits—institutional control of competition and executive recruitment, concentration of national power in a unitary state headed by a strong executive—signify a high degree of institutional power. A composite ten-point indicator of power concentration is built on the regulation of participation, regulation of executive recruitment, competitiveness of executive recruitment, constraints on the chief executive, monocratism, and centralization of authority. While the highest concentrations of institutional power are to be found in highly autocratic polities, high power concentrations are not uncommon among modern democracies.
COHER: Coherence of Political Institutions
Eckstein (1969: 300-307) proposed that polities with coherent (internally consistent) authority patterns should outperform and outlast those with incoherent patterns. Research using the Polity I data set indicator of Coherence generally supported the argument (Gurr 1974, Harmel 1980, Lichbach 1984). "Coherent" polities in Polity II are defined operationally as those which score 7 or more on either Autocracy or Democracy.

POLITY ADAPTABILITY AND PERSISTENCE (INSTCH and PERSIST)
These indicators are constructed to permit testing of hypotheses about relationships among authority patterns (or other independent variables) and the adaptability and persistence of polities. They are more precise interval-measured equivalents of indicators used in the Polity I studies.

INSTCH: Number of Institutional Changes
This is a count of the number of changes on the authority dimensions (variables 2.1 through 2.9) that occurred between the previous year and the present year. They can be used as an indicator of the Adaptability of polities. The indicator makes no distinctions regarding the extent of changes on any of the authority dimensions.

PERSIST: Polity Persistence in Years
This is a measure, in years, of the current age of a polity, i.e. the number of years since the last fundamental, abrupt polity change. For polities that were formed before 1800, the appropriate number of years were added to the score for 1800. The U.S.'s first (and thus far only) polity dates from 1789, thus the 1800 value for the U.S. on this variable is 11. Some pre-modern autocracies were assigned ancient dates of origin based on limited historical information: for example, we dated the Kingdom of Korea from the late 14th century (1800 = 408), Imperial Japan from the mid-13th century (1800 = 550).

MONO: Monocratism
Monocratism was included with Executive Constraints (XCONST) in Polity II as "relevant characteristics of Responsiveness." Monocratism codes the extent to which the chief executive is dependent either formally or informally for his position on a cabinet, council or junta. According to Eckstein and Gurr, the independence of the chief executive can be dissected into a single, fundamental dichotomy: "The simplest and sharpest distinction we can make is between patterns in which monocratic (one-man) rule prevails and those in which some kind of assent is required, whether by especially prestigious minorities of supers, numerical majorities, or virtually all of them. We label the latter 'concurrent' patterns, to distinguish them as a group from 'monocratic' ones." (Eckstein and Gurr, 1975:375) Operationally, MONO focuses on the structural character of the chief executive, distinguishing between pure individual and collective executives and specifying three intermediate categories.

CONFORMATION: THE CENTRALIZATION OF POLITICAL AUTHORITY (CENT and SCOPE)
The centralized/federal distinction is an important structural property of national political systems that is related to several dimensions of authority patterns postulated by Eckstein and Gurr. In purely structural terms it is an aspect of Conformation: federal polities have greater complexity of Conformation than do centralized polities. Opportunities for Participation also tend to be higher in federal systems, and regional units of government potentially are more responsive to local inputs than are centralized governments.
CENT: Centralization of Political Authority
Centralized, unitary state or decentralized, federal state (or intermediate category).

SCOPE: Scope of Government Action
Directiveness is defined as "the extent to which activities in a social unit are subject to directives, rather than being left to the free discretion of members." (Eckstein and Gurr, 1975:53). Directiveness varies from the Regimented extreme, in which "everything done in a social unit is dealt with, in every detail, by rigidly enforced directiveness" to Permissive, a situation in which there is "a tendency to issue directives only insofar as the existence of the unit clearly requires it." (Eckstein and Gurr, 1975:54). SCOPE is an operational version, applicable to the state, of Directiveness. It is a continuum which refers to the extent to which all levels of government combined—national, regional, and local—attempt to regulate and organize the economic and social life of the citizens and subjects of the state. The SCOPE dimension does not refer to the regulation or restriction of political activity, which is registered in the Political Participation variables. In the realm of the state, we characterize the regimented extreme as Totalitarian. The Minimal state is one in which government functions are limited to such core functions as maintenance of the ruler's authority and dispute resolution. Even these activities may only be carried out in the core regions of the national territory. The POLITY I coding of SCOPE used a five-category scale. POLITY II coding employed a nine-category scale: the five categories plus four intermediate categories.

CHANGE: Coding Polity Changes
A polity comprises the basic political arrangements by which autonomous, national political communities ("countries") govern their affairs. Its basic elements are its structures of rule-making and rule-application and their relations with citizens or subjects. The life-span or durability of a polity is the length of time it endures without major, abrupt changes in the pattern of authority relations among these basic elements of authority relations. Major, abrupt changes are coded to reflect the approximate dates of polity termination and establishment as well as whether or not the polity change occurred in a new or established nation.

EVENTS IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING/CAUSING POLITY TERMINATION (TERM1-4)
These variables indicate the general circumstances of a polity's "death" or transformation, with special attention to the presence of crisis or violent conflict, if any. Each of the variables is mutually exclusive except that, rarely, a polity may be terminated under circumstances of both external conflict (TERM2) and violent internal conflict (TERM3).

TERM1: Loss of National Autonomy
Nations whose polities end when the nation itself gives up autonomous existence.

TERM2: External Conflict
Polities terminated in circumstances of international war, threat, or intervention. Coded here only if the nation or its component parts maintain their autonomy; otherwise coded under Loss of National Autonomy, above.

TERM3: Violent Internal Conflict
Polities terminated during or as a direct result of coups and internal wars.

TERM4: Nonviolent Internal Political Transition
For polities terminated under internal circumstances other than those listed under TERM3.
EVENTS SIGNIFYING POLITY FORMATION (ORIG1-5 and MODEL)
These variables indicate the circumstances of a new polity's "birth," with special attention to the
presence of crisis or violent conflict, if any.

ORIG1: Origin of a New Nation’s Polity
Imposed by foreign power, influenced by former colonial power, or indigenous.

ORIG2: Circumstances of a New Nation’s Birth
Nations established in circumstances of international or internal war.

ORIG3: Established Nations, External Conflict
Polities established in existing nations, and after an interregnum, in circumstances of external war,
foreign threat, or direct intervention.

ORIG4: Established Nations, Violent Internal Conflict
Polities established in existing nations during or as a direct result of coups, internal wars, or
massive turmoil (riots, demonstrations).

ORIG5: Nonviolent Internal Political Transitions
Polities established in existing nations under circumstances other than those listed above.

MODEL: Source of Model
The source of inspiration of the new polity's pattern of authority relations.

6. Works Cited

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The Growth of Democracy, Autocracy, and State Power since 1800.” Studies in Comparative


## APPENDIX A:
States, Country Codes, and Coverage Years

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>SCODE</th>
<th>CCODE</th>
<th>Begin Year</th>
<th>End Year</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>AFG</td>
<td>700</td>
<td>1800</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Albania</td>
<td>ALB</td>
<td>339</td>
<td>1914</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>ALG</td>
<td>615</td>
<td>1962</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>ANG</td>
<td>540</td>
<td>1975</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>ARG</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>1825</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>ARM</td>
<td>371</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>AUL</td>
<td>900</td>
<td>1901</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
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APPENDIX B:
Polity IV Guidelines for Narrative Documentation ("Country Reports")

Documentation:
Polity: The Polity documentation and narrative will focus on the institutionalized authority characteristics of the Polity in place as of December 31 of the code year (as will the annual Polity component/concept codes). When there has been a change in Polity codes during the code year, some description of the nature of the change will be included.

Date and Type of Polity Change(s): If there is a substantive change in Polity characteristics during the code year, note the exact day and month of the change and describe how the change was instituted (substantive changes will involve a separate set of Polity component/concept codes—prior and post).

Executive: Identify the current (December 31) executive(s); include official title, full name, and salient party and/or identity group affiliation. Also identify any executive(s) who was/were replaced during the year and how they were replaced.

Legislature: Identify the type of legislature (e.g., unicameral, bicameral); the method of selecting representatives (e.g., direct election, proportional vote, party designation, single-member districts, proportional group); the ruling party or coalition; the date of elections held; and principal parties (as proportion of legislative seats). Also, identify any significant parties who boycotted political process during the year.

Judiciary: Effective and independent?

Narrative:
Executive Recruitment: Explain how the executive was recruited and how assigned codes were assessed. Pay specific attention to explaining ambiguous situations (e.g., why President Bongo of Gabon is not considered an elected executive despite elections).

Executive Constraints: Explain the nature of executive constraints and identify what actor(s) present effective constraints on executive(s); how code were assigned.

Political Competition: Explain how codes were assessed. Identify main identity groups (parties are identified above). If PolComp is Repressed or Restricted, explain how this is enforced. If PolComp is Uninstitutionalized, explain why mobilization has not occurred and/or how it is being mobilized. If there is Factional competition, identify the factions and explain the nature of the factionalism. Identify disenfranchised identity groups. If there are elections, explain the nature of the qualification(s) to openness and/or competitiveness.

Fragmentation: Identify polity “fragments,” general location, and estimated size.

NOTE: The Polity IV Country Report Series was discontinued in 2010 was will be replaced with a new format country report detailing each change in a country’s Polity scores since, at least, 1946; this new report series will be an integral part of the transparency and documentation component of the next generation Polity V data series.
ADDENDUM A:  
Polity IV Executive Recruitment Concepts

As first conceptualized by Eckstein and Gurr (1975, 150), executive recruitment involves the ways in which social superordinates come to occupy their positions of political authority – that is, how institutionalized, competitive and open are the mechanisms for selecting a political leader. In terms of modern democratic theory, democratic systems are defined as those polities that afford their citizens the opportunity to replace their political representatives through regularly scheduled, competitive and open elections. As organized in earlier versions of the Polity datasets, these procedural dimensions of democracy have been captured by three key variables: (1) the extent of institutionalization – or regulation – of executive transfers (XRREG), (2) the competitiveness of executive selection (XRCOMP), and (3) the openness of executive recruitment (XROPEN). Not surprisingly, these three variables are highly interdependent and have tended to organize themselves into eight general patterns of executive recruitment. A more conceptual approach to gauging authority characteristics centers on the identification of the general pattern of executive recruitment. This approach, however, may be more prone to prejudicial assessment of a polity’s “democraticness” and should be used in conjunction with a focused, individual assessment of the three component variables that capture executive recruitment authority patterns. Suffice to say that the results of assessments based on either of the two approaches should result in identical code assignments.
CONCEPT 1: EXECUTIVE SELECTION THROUGH ASCRIPTION

Component Coding Scheme –
XRREG (3) Regulated
XRCOMP (1) Selection
XROPEN (1) Closed

Description: Recruitment of the chief executive (de facto head of government) is determined by hereditary succession.

Checklist of Attributes:

The chief executive assumes their position of power by right of descent (e.g., a king, emperor, czar, emir, etc.).

• If a chief executive proclaims himself (herself) to be a monarch but has not achieved his/her position by lineage rights, the polity is not coded here.
• A polity will not be coded here until a relative actually succeeds a self-proclaimed monarch as ruler.
• If a chief executive successfully attempts to pass on his/her position of power to his/her children through a non-competitive selection process, but does not identify their regime as a monarchy, it may still be coded as such. If this ascriptive form of executive recruitment only lasts two generations, then it may be coded as a form of designation (Concept 3). However, if it extends three generations or beyond, it will be coded here.
• If a chief executive attempts to pass on his/her position of power to his/her children through a non-competitive selection process, but is forced to delegate de jure power to a non-family member (at least temporarily), it is not coded here (code Concept 2 or Concept 3).

The monarch does not share executive powers with either an elected or designated head of government.

• If the monarch is head of state, but not head of government, it is not coded here.
• While there may exist an elected or selected chief minister, if their power vis-à-vis the monarch is largely symbolic, it is coded here.
CONCEPT 2: DUAL EXECUTIVE: ASCRPTION + DESIGNATION

Component Coding Scheme –

XRREG (3) Regulated
XRCOMP (1) Selection
XROPEN (2) Dual Executive-Designation

Description: The position of chief executive (de facto head of government) is shared. Executive recruitment is determined both by hereditary succession and designation.

Checklist of Attributes:

**The monarch assumes their position of power by right of descent while the institutional power of his/her chief minister is dependent on the continued support of the monarch.**

- If the chief minister is designated by the monarch’s court, it is coded here.
- If the chief minister is designated by a “rubber stamp” national assembly, which reflects the will of the monarch, it is coded here.
- If the chief minister is elected or selected by a competitively elected national assembly, it is **not** coded here.

**The monarch shares significant executive powers with a designated head of government.**

- If the balance of power within the executive branch is equally distributed or favors the monarch over the chief minister, it is coded here.
- If the powers of the designated chief minister are so limited as to be inconsequential, it is not coded here (code Concept 1).
- If the balance of power within the executive branch strongly favors the designated chief minister over the monarch, it is **not** coded here (code Concept 3). In other words, while the monarch may have been very powerful at one time, the question one needs to ask is does s/he still hold this power or have they become little more than a head of state? This transition from dual executive to non-ascriptive forms of executive recruitment may occur very gradually and may require a “best guess” estimate as to the exact year of change.
CONCEPT 3: EXECUTIVE RECRUITMENT THROUGH DESIGNATION

Component Coding Scheme –
- XRREG (2) Designational/Transitional
- XRCOMP (1) Selection
- XROPEN (4) Open

Description: Chief executives are chosen by designation by the ruling political elite, without formal competition by parties or individuals representing alternative political viewpoints or platforms.

Checklist of Attributes:

Executive recruitment is closed to everyone who is not a member of the hegemonic party/faction that controls the government.
- If executive succession occurs within a one-party state, it is coded here.
- If non-violent executive succession occurs within a military regime, it is coded here.
- If a hegemonic party or military rulers hold rigged multiparty elections, it is coded here.
- If executive succession is determined by religious, ethnic/regional, or foreign power-holders, it is coded here.
- While electoral competition between members of the closed hegemonic party or faction may be free and fair, so long as rival political viewpoints are excluded from competing, it will continue to be coded here.
- If the political system outlaws all formal political parties but executive recruitment is open to all individuals through non-party electoral competition, it is coded here if the system appears to favor the existing incumbent over all opposition forces. However, if this no-party electoral system does not favor the incumbent (an unlikely scenario), it is not coded here (code Concept 7).

Transfers of executive power do not involve the use, or threat of use, of force.
- Executive recruitment occurs through “regulated” mechanisms in which the use, or threat of use, of force is kept to a minimum (although it is unlikely that it will be completely eliminated). It is important to note that this only deals with violence within the hegemonic system, it is more than likely that repression of political rivals outside the hegemonic system will be pervasive.
- If power struggles within the hegemonic party/faction become widespread, it is not coded here (code Concept 4).
- If the military seizes control of the government by force and then subsequently establishes regulated mechanisms for transferring executive power, it is coded here. However, it may be difficult to determine if this is the case until many years after the coup. This may require a revision of the executive recruitment codes initially coded as Concept 4 to change them to Concept 3.

The outcome of executive recruitment is predetermined by power-sharing arrangements between rival elites or social groups.
- If executive recruitment is pre-determined by a power-sharing arrangement between rival political, economic and/or ethnic groups, it is coded here. This includes consociational arrangements in which the position of chief executive is allocated on the basis of specific ethnic, class, religious, or regional criteria. It also includes those...
systems in which the position of chief executive is “rotated” on the basis of a power-sharing agreement between rival political parties, personalities, or interests. Moreover, these power-sharing arrangements must be achieved through non-democratic mechanisms (that is, the arrangement is negotiated and enacted in the absence of a popular referenda) and the subsequent recruitment of the executive must be largely predetermined by social/political elites with very little citizen participation.

- If the power-sharing arrangement has been approved by popular referenda and the arrangement allows for a significant degree of electoral competition for the position of chief executive, it is not coded here (code Concept 7).
CONCEPT 4: EXECUTIVE RECRUITMENT THROUGH SELF-SELECTION

Component Coding Scheme –

- XRREG (1) Unregulated
- XRCOMP (0) Not applicable
- XROPEN (0) Not applicable

Description: “Unregulated” changes in executive power through forceful seizures of power by rival political elites. In addition to the use, or threat of use, of force, there are no formal mechanisms by which the transfer of executive power is regulated – such as hereditary selection, party designation or elections.

Checklist of Attributes:

Transfers of executive power involve the use, or threat of use, of military force.

- If a successful military coup (which may or may not involve the spilling of blood) results in the direct removal of an existing head of government (elected or otherwise) and their replacement with a member of the armed forces (or their civilian allies), it is coded here.
- If a successful uprising by factions within the armed forces results in the direct removal of an existing head of government (elected or otherwise) and their replacement with a member of this mutinous faction, it is coded here.
- If a political rebellion by regional and/or ethnic power holders results in the direct removal of an existing head of government (elected or otherwise) and their replacement with a member of this rebellious group, it is coded here.
- If a political rebellion/coup led by foreign mercenaries results in the direct removal of an existing head of government (elected or otherwise) and their replacement with either the mercenaries themselves or their domestic sponsors, it is coded here.
- If the chief executive leaves office due to the indirect effects of a failed coup, military uprising, or political rebellion, it is not coded here. This includes the chief executive resigning due to international pressure or the loss of domestic popular or political support in the aftermath of a failed coup attempt.

Political competition is largely the domain of rival social elites.

- Mass-based social revolutions are not coded here. This concept is used to capture the “man on horseback” or “ceasaristic” recruitment process rather than mass-based social revolutions that seek to transform society through the establishment of a hegemonic party apparatus. In other words, if dominant individuals within the social movement are subordinate to the institutions of the movement, rather than standing above it, it is not coded here.

Other Considerations...

- Unregulated or “ceasaristic” transfers of power are sometimes legitimized after the fact in non-competitive elections, popular referendums, or legislative or executive enactment. Despite these legitimization techniques, the executive recruitment variable does not change until the original leader(s) of the regime has been replaced as de facto head of government by either executive designation or competitive elections. Prolonged transitions (2 years or more) to either of these two new forms of executive recruitment, in which the “ceasaristic” ruler continues to dominate the political arena during the interim, are coded as Concept 5.
• Situations in which a standing head of government (elected or otherwise) is forcefully removed from office and "competitive" elections are held within a "reasonable" period of time (give or take 1 year), or the military swiftly returns to the barracks after restoring "order" (give or take 6 months), or the military reestablishes traditional forms of executive recruitment (e.g., monarchy, theocracy, party designation, etc…), are not coded here. It is the intention of the coup-makers that is important. If the military seizes power in order to "reform" the political arena, and takes important steps to extricate themselves from direct power in a timely fashion, a "transition period" (Standard Code – 88) is coded to indicate the interim period between the coup and the reestablishment of "regulated" forms of executive recruitment.

• If the coup-makers are forced from power, either by domestic or international forces, within a relatively short period of time (give or take 6 months), it is not coded here.

• Sporadic violent seizures of power by factions within a hegemonic system (e.g., “palace coups,” leadership struggles within one-party states, etc…) are not coded here unless the new executive seeks to transform the regime in some fundamental way (abolishing the monarchy, becoming “president for life,” eliminating all opposition within the hegemonic regime, etc.). Note: It may be difficult to determine this to be the case until after the leader has been in office for a number of years. However, if these internal struggles become the dominant form of executive recruitment over time (that is, if regulated mechanisms of executive recruitment within the hegemonic system cease to function), it is coded here.

• If the military seizes control of the state apparatus through violent means but rotates executive power between internal factions within the armed forces (or hegemonic party) through non-violent mechanisms, it is not coded here (code Concept 3).
CONCEPT 5: EXECUTIVE-GUIDED TRANSITION

Component Coding Scheme –

- XRREG (2) Designational/Transitional
- XRCOMP (0) Not applicable
- XROPEN (0) Not applicable

Description: A transitional period during which the structures and/or forms of governing authority are redesigned and altered systematically under the specific direction of a ruling executive who gained and/or retained office through "autocratic" means: ascription, designation, or self-selection, with the stated intent of reforming the executive recruitment process and/or increasing the relative influence of the legislative/judicial branches of governance. As distinguished from standard authority coded "transitions" (~88), which involve broad, societal and/or governmental involvement in redesigning central authority and governing institutions, "executive-guided transitions" are dominated by the ruling executive and supporting institutions; involvement by non-executive institutions (e.g., autonomous legislative and judicial institutions or opposition groups/parties) is formally limited, restricted, or prohibited.

Checklist of Attributes:

The current, ruling executive must have been recruited through an autocratic process, including ascription, designation, and self-selection; such forms of executive recruitment are generally backed by the use, or threat of use, of military force. The ruling executive leads the reformation of central authority and controls the outcome(s) of that process by controlling the makeup of the reformation group and the reformation agenda; they also are considered to retain formal or informal veto authority over the reformation process and its outcome(s). The influence of other institutions of governance is limited or restricted; involvement by oppositional elements is generally prohibited, either formally or informally.

- If the chief executive establishes procedures for a transition to competitive elections, but shows no indication that s/he will leave office in the foreseeable future, it is coded here until such time as a new executive is inaugurated who has been elected according to the new procedures. If the leader’s stated goals to lead or return the country to open, competitive elections democracy appear genuine, but the electoral process only serves to confirm the continuity of personalistic power, it is coded here until an electoral change in executive is completed.

- If the chief executive formally establishes procedures for designating his/her successor (through familial lineage, political loyalty or the creation of a hegemonic party), but refuses to relinquish power, it is coded here until the new form of recruitment is determined by an actual transfer of executive authority through regulated procedures.

Other Considerations...

- A polity may coded here if a ruling executive formally steps down from power according to the reformed institutional procedures but continues to exercise the effective reigns of political authority without holding formal office. A polity may continue to be coded here if the newly (s)elected chief executive is clearly subservient to the demands and control of the de facto leader. This requires a judgement call about the extent of political autonomy of the new chief executive. If the “reserved domains of power” of the former executive are substantial, it is coded here until such authority is transferred to the formal executive.
CONCEPT 6: DUAL EXECUTIVE: ASCRIPTION + ELECTION

Component Coding Scheme –

- XRREG (3) Regulated
- XRCOMP (2) Dual/Transitional
- XROPEN (3) Dual Executive-Election

Description: The position of chief executive (de facto head of government) is shared. Executive recruitment is determined both by hereditary succession and election.

Checklist of Attributes:

**The monarch assumes their position of power by right of descent while the institutional power of his/her chief minister is dependent on the outcome of competitive elections.**

- If the chief minister is designated by the monarch’s court, it is not coded here.
- If the chief minister is designated by a “rubber stamp” national assembly, which reflects the will of the monarch, it is not coded here.
- If the chief minister is elected or selected by a competitively elected national assembly, it is coded here.
- If the chief minister is elected by popular referendum, it is coded here.

**The monarch plays an important role in governing the country but their power vis-à-vis the elected chief minister is limited and/or declining.**

- If the balance of power within the executive branch is equally distributed or favors the monarch over the elected chief minister, it is not coded here (code Concept 1).
- If the balance of power within the executive branch strongly favors the elected chief minister over the monarch, but the role of the monarch is not completely symbolic, it is coded here.
- If the monarch has no real institutional powers, it is not coded here. In other words, if the powers of the monarchy have been reduced to symbolic functions or powers of “delay,” the polity is coded as Concept 8.
CONCEPT 7: TRANSITIONAL OR RESTRICTED ELECTIONS

Component Coding Scheme –

- XRREG (2) Designational/Transitional
- XRCOMP (2) Dual/Transitional
- XROPEN (4) Open

Description: The chief executive is chosen through elections matching candidates from at least two independent (although not necessarily major) parties. These elections are “free” but not necessarily “fair” in both design and practice. This category is typically (although not exclusively) used to document “liberalizing elections” held by authoritarian rulers who actively seek to bias the electoral process in their favor. In other words, while elections are competitive (in the sense that elections are held and the results are accepted as binding), nevertheless, the electoral process is stacked – although the results are not predetermined – in favor of one candidate over another. This code may also reflect attempts by elected incumbents to unduly influence the outcome of future elections either to win reelection or in an effort to establish a hegemonic party system or the establishment of quasi-democratic power-sharing arrangements. Finally, it is also used to indicate political systems in which non-elected officials have “reserved domains” of executive power.

Checklist of Attributes:

The elections are deemed to be “free but not fair” by independent international and domestic observers.

- If the outcome of the election is deemed “free” (from fraud and other forms of electoral misconduct) but the process leading up to the election is not considered “fair” by independent international and domestic observer, it is coded here.
- If the number of international electoral monitors is limited and/or their mobility restricted, it is coded here.
- If domestic opposition groups claim fraud but independent international and domestic observers suggest that these “irregularities,” while present, did not significantly effect the outcome of the vote, it is coded here.
- If there appears to be no consensus among international and domestic observers regarding the legitimacy of the electoral process, it is coded here (at least temporarily).
- If elections appear to be fair but an independent electoral commission does not verify election results, it is coded here.

The outcomes of elections are strongly influenced, but not determined, by the incumbent, non-elected officials (e.g., the military, the monarch, etc…) or foreign powers.

- If the incumbent systematically uses his/her official powers to alter the constitution and influence the electoral process to benefit themselves or their party, it is coded here. Included in this category would be attempts by the incumbent to extend their term in office by “dubious” constitutional means, efforts to manipulate competition through new residency laws or changing the timing of elections, and the imposition of a “state of emergency” in opposition strongholds (to name just a few). A polity is coded here only if these types of activities are relatively limited in scope and duration and have only a minor impact on the electoral process. A polity is not coded here if they permanently limit mass participation, restrict elite competition and/or have a profound impact on the outcome of the election.
• While non-elected and foreign actors may influence the electoral process, if they rig the electoral processes so as to predetermine the election of their favored candidates, it is not coded here.
• If elections are held under conditions of direct military occupation by a foreign state but the results are deemed to be “free and fair” by independent domestic and international observers, it is coded here.
• If the military threatens, but does not initiate, a coup in an attempt to manipulate the electoral process, it is coded here.

Major opposition parties face significant, although not insurmountable, obstacles to effective electoral competition.
• If there are limited restrictions, both in terms of scope and duration, on major opposition parties to nominate candidates, mobilize followers or access the media, it is coded here.
• If the government attempts to harass opposition candidates and their followers but still allows them the opportunity to legitimately compete for power in the electoral process, it is coded here.
• If the electoral competition is marred by violence by electoral supporters of various parties/personalities, but this violence does not appear to be part of a systematic effort by the parties themselves to disrupt/alter the electoral process, it is coded here.
• “One-party dominant” states, in which a single party does not lose an electoral contest for an extended period of time (give or take 15 years), may also be coded here. However, this requires a judgement call. One-party dominant states in which electoral outcomes have been predetermined by repression and corruption are not coded here. By the same token, one-party dominant states in which a single party consistently wins electoral contests but does not actively seek to “unfairly” disadvantage political rivals are not coded here. Only those cases in which the dominant party uses its considerable institutional power to influence, but not predetermine, electoral outcomes are coded here.
• Political systems which outlaw all formal political parties but executive recruitment is open to all “independent” individuals through non-party electoral competition may be coded here if the system does not appear to favor the existing incumbent over all opposition forces. However, if this no-party electoral system favors the incumbent over all other opposition forces, it is not coded here (code Concept 3).

Major opposition parties choose not to participate in the electoral process.
• If the major opposition party boycotts the election – for either strategic reasons or as a political protest – it is coded here.

The election takes place in an unstable political environment in which repression and violence affect a significant portion of the population.
• If the elections are held under conditions of widespread civil war – in which large sections of the population (give or take 20%) are prevented by either state or opposition military forces from participating – it is coded here.
• If elections are held under conditions of secessionism – in which a significant portion of the population (give or take 20%) in secessionist regions chose not to participate or are prevented from participating by secessionist leaders – it is coded here.
• If elections take place under the direct military supervision of the United Nations, regional peace organizations or an impartial state, it is coded here.
The chief executive is elected indirectly through a representative assembly that has not been democratically elected.

- If a significant number of voting representatives (give or take 25% of the assembly) have not been freely elected, it is coded here. This includes “transitional legislatures” whose members where elected in non-competitive environments, “non-democratic legislatures” whose members had been hand-selected by the incumbent, and “democratic legislatures with reserved domains of power” in which a significant number of members hold seats in the name of the military or some other entrenched interest group.

- The competitiveness of executive recruitment is limited by power-sharing arrangements between elites or social groups.

- If executive recruitment entails electoral competition but, nonetheless, is constrained by power-sharing arrangements between rival political, economic and/or ethnic groups, it is coded here. In other words, while electoral competition may be a necessary component of executive recruitment, if this process functions within the broad confines of a power-sharing arrangements worked out in advance by rival political elites, it is coded here.

- If such power sharing arrangements have not been approved by popular referenda and/or there exists very little citizen participation in the executive recruitment process, it is not coded here (code Concept 3).

- If the chief executive is freely elected but is “forced” to share power with an equally powerful (but non-elected) vice president or cabinet minister, as dictated by the terms of a power-sharing arrangement, it is coded here.

- If the elected head of government shares executive power with non-elected officials (e.g., the military, a hegemonic party, or a monarch) but, nonetheless, maintains unlimited policy-making discretion regarding the vast majority of issue-areas (give or take 75%), it is coded here.
CONCEPT 8: COMPETITIVE ELECTIONS

Component Coding Scheme –
- XRREG (3) Regulated
- XRCOMP (3) Election
- XROPEN (4) Open

Description: Chief executive (de facto head of government) is chosen through competitive elections matching two or more candidates from at least two major parties. Elections may be popular or by an elected assembly. The electoral process is transparent and its outcomes are institutionally uncertain.

Checklist of Attributes:

The elections are deemed to be “free and fair” by independent international and domestic observers.
- If no international observers are allowed to monitor the elections, it is not coded here.
- If domestic opposition groups claim fraud but these claims are not independently substantiated by international and domestic observers, it is coded here.
- If there appears to be no consensus among international and domestic observers regarding the transparency of the electoral process, it is not coded here.
- An independent electoral commission must verify electoral results.

The outcomes of elections are not “significantly” influenced by the incumbent, non-elected officials (e.g., the military, the monarch, etc.) or foreign powers.
- If the incumbent uses his/her official powers to alter the constitution or unduly influence the electoral process to benefit themselves or their party, it is not coded here. Included in this category would be attempts by the incumbent to extend their term in office by “dubious” constitutional means, efforts to manipulate competition through new residency laws or changing the timing of elections, and the imposition of a “state of emergency” in opposition strongholds (to name just a few).
- While non-elected and foreign actors may influence the electoral process, if they rig the electoral processes so as to predetermined the election of their favored candidates, it is not coded here.
- If elections are held under conditions of direct military occupation by a foreign state, it is not coded here.
- If the military threatens a coup if specific candidates or parties are elected, it is not coded here.

Major opposition parties participate vigorously in the electoral process.
- If the major opposition party boycotts the election – for either strategic reasons or as a political protest – it is not coded here.
- If there are significant restrictions on major opposition parties to nominate candidates, mobilize followers or access the media, it is not coded here.
The election takes place in an environment that is free from systematic repression or control by either state or non-state actors.

- If the elections are held under conditions of widespread civil war – in which large sections of the population (give or take 20%) are prevented by either state or opposition military forces from participating – it is not coded here.
- If elections are held under conditions of secessionism – in which a significant portion of the population (give or take 20%) in secessionist regions chose not to participate or are prevented from participating by secessionist leaders – it is not coded here.
- If elections take place under the direct military supervision of the United Nations, regional peace organizations or an impartial state, it is not coded here. This category should be reserved for those states that can conduct their elections without external military control or supervision.

If the chief executive is elected indirectly through a representative assembly, then this assembly must be freely elected.

- If a significant number of voting representatives (give or take 25% of the assembly) have not been freely elected, it is not coded here. This includes “transitional legislatures” whose members were elected in non-competitive environments, “non-democratic legislatures” whose members had been hand-selected by the incumbent, and “democratic legislatures with reserved domains of power” in which a significant number of members hold seats in the name of the military or some other entrenched interest group.

Executive recruitment must be fundamentally competitive in nature and not the result of power-sharing arrangements between elites or social groups.

- While electoral competition may exist, if executive recruitment is primarily predetermined by power-sharing arrangements between rival political, economic and/or ethnic groups, it is not coded here. This includes consociational arrangements in which the chief executive is recruited on the basis of pre-specified ethnic criteria. It also includes those systems in which the chief executive is recruited on the basis of a power-sharing agreement between political parties/personalities/interests that agree to rotate power.
- If the chief executive is freely elected but is “forced” to share power with an equally powerful (but non-elected) vice president or cabinet minister, as dictated by the terms of a power-sharing arrangement, it is not coded here.
- If the elected chief executive is the de jure, but not the de facto, leader of the country, it is not coded here. In other words, if fundamental social power rests in the hands of non-elected officials (e.g., the military, a hegemonic party, or a monarch), and the elected chief executive simply serves as window dressing for the autocratic state, it is not coded here.
ADDENDUM B:
Polity IV Executive Constraints Concepts

This variable refers to the extent of institutional constraints on the decision-making powers of the chief executive, whether an individual or a collective executive. This is similar to the notion of “horizontal accountability” found in the democracy literature but it assumes that dictators may also be bound by certain institutional constraints. Limits on the chief executive may be imposed by any “accountability group” in the polity. In Western democracies the executive branch is typically constrained by the legislative and judicial branches of government. Other kinds of accountability groups are the ruling party in a one-party system, a council of nobles or powerful advisors in monarchies, and the military in coup-prone polities. The degree of checks and balances between the various parts of the government is coded on a 7-point scale which ranges from “unlimited executive authority” (1) to “executive parity or subordination” (7).
CONCEPT 1: UNLIMITED EXECUTIVE AUTHORITY

Component Coding Scheme – XCONST (1)

Description: There are no regular limitations on the executive’s actions (as distinct from irregular limitations such as the threat or actuality of coups and assassinations).

Checklist of Attributes:

• Constitutional restrictions on executive action are ignored.
• The constitution is frequently revised or suspended at the executive’s initiative.
• There is no legislative assembly (or if there is one it has no power and is called and dismissed at the executive’s pleasure).
• The executive appoints a majority of members of any accountability group and can remove them at will.
• If there is a legislature it cannot initiate legislation or veto or suspend any acts of the executive.
• Rule by decree is repeatedly used.
• Military dictatorships which centralize political power in the hands of a single military officer (or a small number of officers) are typically coded here. If a legislature, dominant party apparatus, or military executive committee rules in conjunction with the chief executive, the polity is coded here if these bodies simply reflect the will of the executive. If these bodies have significant autonomy from the chief executive, it is coded as Concept 2 or Concept 3.
• Absolutist monarchies, regardless of their openness to public dissent or respect for civil liberties, are typically coded here. In other words, this code is not used to differentiate between benevolent absolute monarchs and malevolent ones. So long as constraints on their power are non-existent, it is coded here.
• Personalist dictatorships are typically coded here.
• One-party states may, or may not, be coded here. If the ruler of a one-party state stands above the party structure, and the structure simply serves his/her wishes, it is coded here. However, if the party apparatus serves as a significant check on the chief executive, it is coded as Concept 2 or Concept 3 depending on the degree of constraint.
• If the chief executive is given unlimited power by a legislature (or other body) to cope with a national emergency, and subsequently relents this power after the emergency has passed, it is not coded here. However, if “emergency powers” are in effect for more than two years, it may be coded here or as an “interregnum” (Standard Code –77).
CONCEPT 2: INTERMEDIATE CATEGORY #1

Component Coding Scheme – XCONST (2)

Description: This code is used to indicate a transition between Concept 3 and Concept 1. For example, a polity is coded here if an absolute monarch (or other type of autocrat) establishes a “consultive assembly” or the leader of a one-party state begins to consolidate his/her political power over the party apparatus. This is a judgement call and is often very hard to document – it often just reflects a feeling that power within the autocratic regime is either contracting or expanding. As a general rule this code should only be used to indicate gradual transitions in the degree of executive constraints and should not be used for more than ten years at a time.

CONCEPT 3: SLIGHT TO MODERATE LIMITATIONS

Component Coding Scheme – XCONST (3)

Description: There are some real but limited restraints on the executive.

Checklist of Attributes:

- The legislature initiates some categories of legislation.
- The legislature delays implementation of executive acts and decrees.
- The executive fails to change some constitutional restrictions, such as prohibitions on succeeding himself, or extending his term.
- The ruling party initiates some legislation or takes some administrative action independently of the executive.
- Strong, institutionalized one-party states are typically coded here. If the party apparatus is dominated by a single individual, it is coded as Concept 2 or Concept 1.
- Highly bureaucratized and long-standing military regimes, in which numerous military officers (or their civilian surrogates) have held the position of chief executive, will typically be coded here.
- Democratically elected chief executives (or so-called “democratic-authoritarian” leaders) may be coded here if they thoroughly dominate the political systems in which they operate. The judiciary must be dominated by the executive branch and the legislature must be clearly subordinate to its wishes. In other words, the “horizontal accountability” of the chief executive is extremely limited. This position of executive dominance is usually the result of (1) institutional structures that place the executive in a position of dominance and (2) a weak or sharply divided legislature that is unable to effectively sanction the chief executive.
CONCEPT 4: INTERMEDIATE CATEGORY #2

Component Coding Scheme – XCONST (4)

Description: Used to indicate a transition between Concept 3 and Concept 5. For example, a polity is coded here to indicate the emergence of real, albeit limited, constraints on executive authority in a previously autocratic (or “democratic-authoritarian”) system or the weakening of “horizontal accountability” in a democratic system which already gives significant powers to the chief executive. This is a judgement call and is often very difficult to document. As a general rule, this code should only be used to indicate a gradual transition in the degree of executive constraints and should not be used for more than ten years at a time.

CONCEPT 5: SUBSTANTIAL LIMITATIONS

Component Coding Scheme – XCONST (5)

Description: The executive has more effective authority than any accountability group but is subject to substantial constraints by them.

Checklist of Attributes:

- A legislature or party council often modifies or defeats executive proposals for action.
- A council or legislature sometimes refuses funds to the executive.
- The accountability group makes important appointments to administrative posts.
- The legislature refuses the executive permission to leave the country.
- This code is typically associated with “strong” presidential regimes in otherwise democratic systems. These systems can either be created by design or simply reflect the inability of the legislature to act as a cohesive block to limit the powers of the executive branch. In either case, it usually signifies some separation of power which, for either institutional or political reasons, the chief executive has gained the upper hand. While it is not impossible for a parliamentary system to be coded here, it is much less common. A conditions where a parliamentary system may meet the criteria is if the head of the party that wins the election is completely dominated by a single figure who, in turn, becomes chief executive in a non-coalition government. However, it is more likely to coded as Concept 6.
- If the chief executive completely dominates the judicial branch but, nonetheless, faces significant constraints by the legislative branch, it is coded here.
CONCEPT 6: INTERMEDIATE CATEGORY #3

Component Coding Scheme – XCONST (6)

Description: This score is used to indicate a transition between Concept 5 and Concept 7. For example, a polity is coded here to reflect a weakening of executive authority vis-à-vis the legislative and/or judicial branches or a strengthening of executive authority vis-à-vis these branches of government. This code may also reflect the decision on the part of the legislature to grant the chief executive “emergency powers” in times of a national crisis or, in a hybrid regime – which grants significant executive powers to both a president and prime minister – when the head of state and the head of government are from the same party. However, as a general rule this code will be used to indicate a gradual change in executive constraints or reflect temporary changes in the balance of power within the polity and, as such, will not be used for more than ten years at a time.

CONCEPT 7: EXECUTIVE PARITY OR SUBORDINATION

Component Coding Scheme – XCONST (7)

Description: Accountability groups have effective authority equal to or greater than the executive in most activity.

Checklist of Attributes:

• A legislature, ruling party, or council of nobles initiates much or most important legislation.
• The executive (president, premier, king, cabinet, council) is chosen by the accountability group and is dependent on its continued support to remain in office (as in most parliamentary systems).
• Most consolidated democracies are coded here.
ADDENDUM C:
Polity IV Political Competition Concepts

The Polity dataset measures two dimensions of political competition: (1) the degree of institutionalization, or regulation, of political competition (PARREG) and (2) the extent of government restriction on political competition (PARCOMP).

Participation is institutionalized or regulated to the extent that there are binding rules on “if, when, and how” political preferences are organized and expressed. One-party states and Western democracies both regulate participation but they do so differently, the former by channeling participation through a hegemonic political organization, which places sharp limits on diversity of opinion; the latter by allowing relatively stable and enduring groups to compete nonviolently for political influence and power. The polar opposite is unregulated participation, in which there are no enduring national political organizations and no effective regime controls on political activity. In such situations political competition is fluid and often characterized by recurring, contentious interactions and shifting coalitions of strongly partisan groups.

The competitiveness of political participation refers to the extent to which alternative preferences for policy formation and leadership roles can be pursued in the political arena.

In summary, while PARREG measures the degree of organization and institutionalization of participation, PARCOMP measures the degree to which this political participation is free from government control. In Polity I these two indicators were combined to identify ten broad patterns of political competition scaled to roughly correspond with the degree of “democraticness” of political competition within the polity. The conceptual and operational dimensions of this concept are outlined below.
CONCEPT 1: REPRESSED COMPETITION

Component Coding Scheme –
PARREG (4) Restricted
PARCOMP (1) Repressed

Description: While no significant political activity is permitted outside the ranks of the hegemonic regime, nevertheless, some organized political participation occurs within the regime through highly circumscribed institutional channels.

Checklist of Attributes:

The polity is institutionally “closed” (both de jure and de facto).
- Totalitarian party systems, military regimes, personalistic dictatorships, and despotic monarchies are typically coded here.

The hegemonic regime officially bans all organized opposition groups.
- If the regime bans the organization of all rival political parties and oppositional social movements, the polity is coded here. However, if the regime’s ban on oppositional political activity is not enforced or is effectively ignored, it is not coded here.
- If the regime only bans some political parties and/or tacitly allows the functioning opposition social movements, it is not coded here.
- If the regime bans all political parties but allows “independent” oppositional activity, it is not coded here (code Concept 2). However, if these “independents” are simply a front for the ruling party/faction, it is coded here.

The hegemonic regime has both the political capacity and willingness to effectively exclude opponents from the political arena.
- The regime’s closed institutional structure must be matched by its demonstrated authority to suppress the organization of opposition forces. However, this does not necessarily imply that these regimes will be the most physically repressive of all polity types. Greater violations of human rights may actually take place in less institutionally repressive political systems. Individuals may decide not challenge the closed system out of fear, cultural norms, and/or regime legitimacy.
- If the regime is unable to effectively suppress the political activities of opposition groups – as manifested by rebellion or mass-based political protests – it is not coded here. This is a judgement call. If these oppositional activities are met with state repression (authority enforcement measures) and are, thus, limited in scope and duration, it will be coded here. If fragmentation occurs and the polity can not effectively impose its authority in oppositional regions, thus limiting the scope and duration of state repression, it is coded here. However, if oppositional activity undermines central authority to a substantial degree such that central authority collapses or is confined to less than 50 percent of its mandated territory, then, it is coded as an “interregnum” (Standard Code -77).
**CONCEPT 2: RESTRICTED COMPETITION**

Component Coding Scheme –  
PARREG (4) Restricted  
PARCOMP (2) Suppressed

Description: Some organized political activity occurs outside the ranks of the hegemonic regime, but the regime systematically limits its form, extent, or both in ways that exclude substantial groups from participating in the political arena and/or suppresses the contestation of rival political interests.

*Checklist of Attributes:*

**The polity is institutionally “closed” (de facto but not necessarily de jure).**
- Single-party systems, military regimes, personalistic dictatorships, and monarchies are often coded here. While these regimes may preside over “open” constitutional orders, in reality power is highly concentrated, potential challenges are restricted, and political competition is significantly suppressed.

**The regime systematically restricts major opposition groups.**
- If the regime selectively bans its major ideological or political rivals, it is coded here. However, if the regime indiscriminately bans the organization of all opposition parties and social movements, it is not coded here (code Concept 1).
- If the regime bans all official political parties but allows independent oppositional activity, it is coded here. However, if these “independents” are simply a front for the ruling party/faction, it is not coded here (code Concept 1).
- If the regime bans all major rival parties but allows minor political parties to operate, it is coded here. However, these parties must have some degree of autonomy from the ruling party/faction and must represent a moderate ideological/philosophical, although not political, challenge to the incumbent regime.
- If the regime permits major opposition groups to organize but not to participate in electoral competition, it is coded here.
- If the regime allows all political groups to compete in the political arena but systematically represses them (e.g., leaders killed, jailed or sent into exile; candidates regularly ruled off ballots; opposition media banned or harassed), it is coded here. However, these tactics must be part of a systematic effort to maintain power by the hegemonic party/faction and its followers. If these repressive policies occur only sporadically, are limited in scope, or are not associated with a hegemonic regime, it will be coded as Concept 6, 7, 8 or 9.

**The hegemonic regime lacks the political capacity and/or willingness to effectively exclude political opponents from the political arena.**
- If the regime seeks to create a closed, hegemonic political system but is unable to control its political opposition – as manifested by open acts of rebellion or mass-based political protests – it is coded here. This is a judgement call. A polity is only coded here if these activities are extensive in duration (say more than 5 years) and/or scope (they affect most areas of the country). Otherwise, it is coded Concept 1.
The regime seeks to selectively exclude substantial segments of the population (but not all alternative political agendas) from participating in the political arena on the basis of identity, culture, or religion.

- If excluded groups consist of 20% or more of the adult population and these groups are denied all political rights, it is coded here.
- If excluded groups consist of more than 20% of the adult population and are permitted limited political rights (e.g., the right to vote but not the right to form a political party or hold political office, etc.), the polity is not coded here. It is coded Concept 6, 7, 8 or 9 depending on the extent of exclusion and the size of the group being excluded.
- If excluded groups consist of more than 20% of the population and are provided with full political rights but, nonetheless, continue to face state-sponsored policies of harassment and intimidation, it is not coded here. It is coded as Concept 6, 7, 8, 9 or 10 depending on the extent of harassment and the size of the group.
- If excluded groups consist of less than 20% of the adult population, the polity is not coded here. It is coded as Concept 6, 7, 8, 9 or 10 depending on the extent of exclusion and the size of the group.
CONCEPT 3: AUTHORITARIAN-GUIDED LIBERALIZATION OF REPRESSED OR RESTRICTED COMPETITION OR THE DEEPENING OF HEGEMONIC CONTROL.

Component Coding Scheme –
   PARREG   (3) Sectarian
   PARCOMP  (2) Suppressed

Description: Used to indicate either the concerted effort on the part of hegemonic regimes to open up their political systems to limited (and typically factional) political competition or the transformation of factional-based “quasi-democracies” or “weak authoritarian regimes” into more repressive hegemonic systems in which political competition is increasingly institutionalized and restricted. This code should typically only be used for a limited period of time (ten years or less) to indicate a concerted, gradual transformation of a polity from repressed or restricted competition (Concept 1 or Concept 2) to either factional/restricted or factional competition (Concept 6 or Concept 7) or from factional or factional/restricted competition (Concept 7 or Concept 6) to restricted or repressed competition (Concept 2 or Concept 1).
CONCEPT 4: UNINSTITUTIONALIZED COMPETITION

Component Coding Scheme –

PARREG (1) Unregulated
PARCOMP (0) Not applicable

Description: Political participation is decentralized and fluid in character – revolving around personalities, regional interests, and religious/ethnic/clan groups. There are no enduring national political organizations and systematic regime control of political activity is limited, that is, a situation characterized by a coincidence of weak state and weak society. These conditions are increasingly rare following decolonization and the increasing globalization of economic exchange systems. In the contemporary context, uninstitutionalized competition is most likely to occur in resource poor countries and/or following the collapse of central authority under a (former) repressive, authoritarian state.

Checklist of Attributes:

Typically found in “traditional” societies with “weak” central state political systems in which state authority has not been effectively established or consolidated.

• State institutions are weak and have little direct control over either the citizens or resources under their jurisdiction.
• National political parties are weak or non-existent.

The main political objective of partisan power struggles within the polity is not to capture control of state institutions or to establish a competing polity per se but the protection of local interests from central influence and control.

• Mobilization of local interests is focused mainly on resisting the extension of state control and infrastructure to historically remote areas that have operated autonomously or in relative isolation from “modern” social exchange networks.

Unregulated participation may be associated with polities that have experienced “state failure.”

• If central state institutions are unable to consistently provide a minimal level of authority and coordination over a reasonable portion (50 percent) of its territory, the polity is no longer operative and the collapse of the central state will be denoted by the Standard Code “-77.” The “interregnum” code is more appropriate under these circumstances as it denotes the complete breakdown of central authority rather than simply identifying institutional incompetence and/or a lack of institutions for management of political participation (a condition that may result from societal underdevelopment or state repression).
• Unregulated competition, on its own volition, is unlikely to bring about the collapse of central authority, except under conditions of extreme privation, incompetent leadership, and a precipitating event such as a natural disaster or foreign war (whereby the regime “implodes”). Severe factionalism (Concept 7) is much more likely to challenge the continuity of state authority.
CONCEPT 5: GRADUAL TRANSITION FROM UNINSTITUTIONALIZED (UNREGULATED) COMPETITION

Component Coding Scheme –
PARREG (2) Multiple Identity
PARCOMP (0) Not applicable

Description: Gradual transition from unregulated political participation – participation that is fluid and decentralized in character – to more regulated forms of political competition (the increasing regulation of competition may be centrally-guided or decentralized through the gradual development of political parties and interest groups). Gradual transition is necessarily based on the parallel and non-contentious development of state and societal capacities.

Checklist of Attributes:

Gradual development of national-based political parties within the polity.
• Typically used to capture the evolution of a national-based party structure that emerges slowly over decades. This may result in the formation of multiple, competing political parties and interests or the evolution of a one-party state (depending on the development dynamic: bottom-up or top-down; and the expressed nature of the social consensus: uniform or diverse).

Gradual centralization of political authority within the polity.
• Typically used to capture the consolidation of state capacity that emerges slowly over decades. This political authority may be characterized by either democratic or autocratic authority modes but general societal acceptance or acquiescence to the prevalent mode is requisite.

May be used to describe emerging polities or polities that are re-emerging from foreign domination or “state failure.”
• In the wake of foreign domination or a state failure, if a central government (re)emerges and gradually (re)establishes political authority and political competition gradually reorganizes with and/or in support of emerging state institutions, it is coded here.
• In the wake of foreign domination or a state failure, if a central government (re)emerges and uses its power to control (limit) the formation and expression of political interests and perspectives, it is coded as Concept 3.
CONCEPT 6: FACTIONAL/RESTRICTED COMPETITION

Component Coding Scheme –

PARREG (3) Sectarian
PARCOMP (3) Fractional

Description: Polities that oscillate more or less regularly between intense factionalism and faction-based restrictions: that is, when one faction secures power it uses that power to promote its exclusive interests and favor group members while restricting the political access and activities of other, excluded groups, until it is displaced in turn. Also coded here are polities where the group or coalition in power maintains that power over time and uses central authority to exclude substantial groups from access to resources and restrict the identity/interest mobilization of groups that may, potentially, seek greater access.

Checklist of Attributes:

Shares many of the same characteristics of factional competition (see Concept 7) but entails greater levels of government recognition of group differences and promotion of exclusionary ideologies, and lesser levels of group interaction.

• Factional/restricted participation is more restricted than factional participation (Concept 7) but less restricted than repressive participation (Concept 2).
• It is less likely, although not inconceivable, that factional/restricted participation will be associated with democratic electoral systems. A sizeable, cohesive identity-group may constitute a stable majority in a multiple identity electoral system and use central authority to the detriment of minority groups; similar to de Tocqueville’s “tyranny of the majority.” However, a rule of thumb is that competitive electoral systems are more often than not associated with factional competition (Concept 7) than factional/restricted competition (Concept 6) as electoral politics are associated with relatively open competition. Conversely, authoritarian systems with no, or highly circumscribed, electoral systems are more often than not associated with factional/restricted competition (Concept 6) than factional competition (Concept 7).

The regime seeks to exclude substantial segments of the population from participating in the political arena on the basis of class, race, ethnicity, culture, or religion.

• If excluded groups consist of 20% or more of the adult population and these groups are denied all political rights, the polity is not coded here (code Concept 2). If excluded groups comprise less than 20% of the adult population and are denied all political rights, it is coded here.
• If the regime can not effectively deny political access and/or action to “other,” excluded identity groups, regardless of size, it is not coded here (code Concept 7).
• If excluded groups (regardless of size) are permitted limited political rights (e.g., the right to vote but not the right to form a political party or hold political office, etc.), it may be coded here (or Concept 7 or Concept 8).
CONCEPT 7: FACTIONAL COMPETITION

Component Coding Scheme –
  PARREG (2) Multiple Identity
  PARCOMP (3) Factional

Description: There are relatively stable and enduring political groups which compete for political influence at the national level – parties, regional groups, or ethnic groups – but particularist/parochial agendas tend to be exclusive and uncompromising with limited social integration or accommodation across identity boundaries. As such, competition among them is often intense, antagonistic, hostile, and frequently coercive. Factional competition is distinguished by a relative balance of group capabilities that prevents any one of the groups from capturing state power and imposing restrictions on other groups. This condition can also appear when the state is a relatively autonomous entity that attempts to broker “peace” among contending factions.

Checklist of Attributes:

Factional participation can occur in both electoral democracies and authoritarian systems. In the former case participation has not been effectively regulated, while in the latter it has not been effectively restricted. Thus, this type of participation is not conducive to the consolidation of democracy nor autocracy.

- In electoral systems, national elections for both executive and legislative branches of government are deemed to be “free” but not “fair” by domestic and international observers.
- The electoral process is often rife with partisan-based political violence.
- The government consistently uses its institutional powers to interfere with, and/or unduly influence the outcome of, the electoral process.
- A polity is coded here if democratic elections are held in an environment of persistent and widespread civil unrest (rebellion, revolution, and/or ethnic conflict).

While some social groups may be routinely excluded from the political process, competition between the major groups is both active and intense. This competition, however, is not necessarily confined to the electoral arena.

- Factional competition is often associated with “oligarchic democracies” – systems in which rival elites, with distinct regional backgrounds, clientalist networks and/or economic interests, compete for political power.
- Factional competition is often associated with “plural societies” – societies in which rival ethnic/racial/religious/cultural groups compete for political power (or political autonomy/secession) in the absence of effective, cross-cutting political parties.
- Factional competition is often associated with societies deeply divided by “class consciousness” – societies in which rival classes actively struggle with each other for control of the state apparatus.
- Factional competition is often associated with “market transition systems” – systems in which elites in charge of a withering command economy seek to secure their economic/political/ideological interests in the face of electoral competition from market/political reformers.
- Factional competition is often associated with “weak one-party systems” – systems in which the hegemonic party simply serves as an umbrella organization for competing
factional interests. While political participation outside the party is restricted, participation within the party is intense, competitive and typically antagonistic.

• Factional competition may be associated with “military dominated electoral systems” – systems in which elections are dominated by factions aligned with personalistic leaders or ethnic/regional affiliations within the military.

Either widespread party fractionalization or intense two-party competition may characterize factional participation.

• If numerous political parties – say more than 10 – regularly contest national elections it may be a sign that political competition is factional, however, this is not a definitive threshold. In addition to the sheer number of parties, it is also important to note their durability and their tendencies toward the coordination of oppositional behavior and engagement in systematic and sustained, disruptive political action. While the major parties may be fluid – here one election, gone the next – so long as the issues they represent continue to be organized in new party organizations, it may be coded here. The key feature of factionalism is that opposition to the status quo authority structures is strongly polarized and this polarization overcomes issue divisions and allows coordination of anti-system action despite fundamental ideological and/or practical policy differences.

• If the major political parties are largely personalistic in nature – that is, they revolve around dominant personalities rather than ideological platforms – this may be a sign that competition is factional. Once again, this is a judgement call. If these personalistic parties are relatively durable in nature and competition between them is fierce, it may be coded here. If they are highly fluid and/or competition is relatively benign, it is coded as Concept 1, 2 or 9.

• If two or three major political parties dominate the political system but competition between them is typically antagonistic, it is coded here.

Major political parties are exclusive, rather than inclusive, in character or a secular regime seeks to limit the political influence of non-secular parties or movements.

• If the major political parties are primarily sectarian in nature – that is, they revolve around exclusive ethnic/racial/religious/regional social networks (to the exclusion of other social networks), it may be coded here. However, these “exclusive party systems” will be coded here if they are associated with extrajudicial coercion which may, or may not, be directed by the parties themselves.

• If the political environment is dominated by political organizations that actively compete in the electoral process but the use of non-party class instruments (e.g., labor unions, police, paramilitary groups, etc.) to coerce and intimidate opposition class forces is routine, it is coded here.

• If the major political parties are secular in nature and actively seek to limit – but not prohibit – the political activities of non-secular political parties/movements, it is coded here.
CONCEPT 8: POLITICAL LIBERALIZATION OR DEMOCRATIC RETRENCHMENT: PERSISTENT OVERT COERCION

Component Coding Scheme –
   PARREG          (3) Sectarian
   PARCOMP         (4) Transitional

Description: This code is used to indicate relatively coercive/restrictive transitions either from factional/restricted competition (Concept 6) to institutionalized competitive participation (Concept 10) or from institutionalized competitive participation to factional/restricted competition. In either case, this code reflects the unconsolidated nature of liberal political participation in otherwise procedurally democratic polities. For example, while the polity may be making great strides toward institutionalizing democratic participation, if the government has not completely foreclosed the use of coercion to achieve partisan domestic policy objectives and/or scattered segments of the population (or remnants of factions) continue to promote violence as a viable political tool, it is coded here. This code has many of the same characteristics as found in Concept 9 but the use of coercion and repression are more pronounced.

Checklist of Attributes:

As a general rule this code will only be used for a limited time (10 years or less) to indicate a major transition from factional/restricted competition to institutionalized electoral competition (or vice-versa). If the polity’s transition becomes stalled during the course of a decade, the regime will be coded as Concept 6, 7 or 9 depending on the progress that has been made toward either liberalizing or restricting political participation. See Concept 9 for the general conditions that also apply to this code.

What distinguishes Concept 8 from Concept 9 is the persistent, albeit relatively limited, use of coercion by government agents and opposition actors. Some examples of this form of political competition include, but are not limited to, the following:

• National elections for the executive and legislative branches of government are deemed to be “free” but not necessarily “fair” by domestic and international observers. A polity is coded here if elections are deemed to be “unfair” because (1) they are marred by systematic yet limited partisan-based political violence, (2) the government uses its coercive powers to interfere with, but not predetermine, the outcome of the electoral process, and (3) democratic elections are held in an environment of a persistent, yet largely ineffective or waning, civil violence or ethnic conflict.

• Some minor social groups are routinely excluded from the political process by government repression. A polity is coded here if all major domestic groups have equal institutional opportunities to access the political process (although certain groups may dominate the political agenda) but some minor groups face significant government repression in their efforts to organize or participate in the political process.

• If the polity holds democratic elections but nonetheless experiences substantial and significant violations of civil liberties, it is coded here. Examples of civil rights abuses include, but are not limited to, the following:
   Media/literature censorship
   Restrictions on the content of public discussion
   Limits on freedom of assembly and demonstration
   Military/police brutality
Unjustified imprisonment
Draconian penal code
Constraints on labor, peasant or business organizations
Barriers on religious practice, property rights, travel, choice of residence, etc.

Note: It is important to note that there is no magic threshold on the number, types, or intensity of civil rights violations required to be coded here. It is also important to note that Polity primarily seeks to measure the institutional dimensions of democracy and, therefore, concerns over violations of civil liberties should inform but not necessarily determine how political competition is coded.
CONCEPT 9: POLITICAL LIBERALIZATION OR DEMOCRATIC RETRENCHMENT: LIMITED AND/OR DECREASING OVERT COERCION

Component Coding Scheme –
- PARREG (2) Multiple Identity
- PARCOMP (4) Transitional

Description: This code is used to indicate relatively peaceful transitions either to or from institutionalized competitive participation (see Concept 10). In either case, this code reflects the unconsolidated nature of liberal political participation in otherwise procedurally open electoral polities. There is no time limit for the use of this code.

Checklist of Attributes:

National elections for the executive and legislative branches of government are deemed to be “free” but not necessarily “fair” by domestic and international observers.
- If a single party dominates both the executive and legislative branches continuously for an extended period of time (15-20 years), it may indicate that political competition is being restricted. So called “single party democracies” may or may not be the byproduct of restricted competition. If opposition parties in such systems pose no real electoral threat to the dominant party and they do not actively challenge their policies and/or they face minor institutional barriers to competing in the electoral arena, it is coded here.
- If the major opposition parties consistently receive less than 25% of the electoral vote in executive and legislative elections, it may indicate that electoral competition is being restricted. However, while there is no definitive electoral threshold, if these parties receive less than 25% of the vote and do not actively challenge the policies of the dominant party and/or they face minor institutional barriers to competing in the electoral arena, it is coded here.
- The electoral process is marred by sporadic and/or limited partisan-based political violence.
- The government uses its institutional powers to interfere with, but not predetermine, the outcome of the electoral process. This interference should, for the most part, not include the overt use of repression.
- If the government establishes unreasonable “minimum vote” thresholds for inclusion in the National Assembly, it is coded here.

Some minor social groups are routinely excluded from the political process.
- A polity is coded here if all major domestic groups have equal institutional opportunities to access the political process (although certain groups may dominate the political agenda) but some minor groups face significant obstacles to organizing or participating in the political process.

Political parties are weak and fluid in nature.
- If numerous political parties (10 or more) regularly contest national elections and most are relatively fluid in nature – here one election, gone the next – it is coded here. However, depending on the degree of factionalism and coercion present in the system it may more appropriately be coded Concept 6, 7, or 8.
- If the major political parties have traditionally been personalistic in character – that is, they revolved around dominant personalities rather than ideological platforms – but are
making efforts to institutionalize their organizational structures, it is coded here.

• May be used to depict political competition in the early years of a democratic transition in which political parties that have either been moribund for many years, are newly established, and/or are required to compete in democratic elections. Under these conditions parties are likely to be weak – revolving around specific personalities, issues, affiliations, or nationalism.

• May also be used to depict the nature of political competition in the early years of a democratic transition in which the former hegemonic party continues to predominate in the electoral process due to its established, superior organizational and financial resources.

Major political parties are largely parochial or identity-based rather than broad-based or secular-based governments seek to limit the influence of non-secular political parties.

• If the major political parties have traditionally been sectarian in nature – that is, they revolved around exclusive ethnic, racial, religious, or regional social networks (to the exclusion of other social networks) but are intentionally evolving into “catch-all” parties, the polity is coded here.

• If the major political parties are secular in nature and actively seek to limit the political activities of non-secular political parties/movements, this may indicate factional rather than competitive competition. The polity is coded here if the government tries to limit the activities of these groups through constitutional mechanisms but does not resort to systematic state repression to achieve their goals (guided secularization).

Human rights and civil liberties are subject to limited and/or sporadic violation.

• If the polity holds democratic elections but nonetheless experiences common, but not systematic, violations of civil liberties, it is coded here. Examples of civil rights abuses include, but are not limited to, the following:
  - Media/literature censorship
  - Restrictions on the content of public discussion
  - Limits on freedom of assembly and demonstration
  - Military/police brutality
  - Unjustified imprisonment
  - Draconian penal code
  - Constraints on labor, peasant or business organizations
  - Barriers on religious practice, property rights, travel, choice of residence, etc.
CONCEPT 10: INSTITUTIONALIZED OPEN ELECTORAL PARTICIPATION

Component Coding Scheme –
PARREG (5) Regulated
PARCOMP (5) Competitive

Description: Relatively stable and enduring political groups regularly compete for political influence with little use of coercion. No significant or substantial groups, issues, or types of conventional political action are regularly excluded from the political process.

Checklist of Attributes:

National elections for both executive and legislative branches of government are deemed to be “free and fair” by domestic and international observers.
• A rotation of power by competing parties is not necessary for a polity to be coded here. However, if a single party dominates both the executive and legislative branches continuously for an extended period of time (15-20 years), it may indicate that political competition is being restricted. So called “single party democracies” may or may not be the byproduct of restricted competition. While opposition parties in such systems may pose no real electoral threat to the dominate party, so long as they actively challenge their policies and face no significant institutional barriers to competing in the electoral arena, the polity is coded here.
• If the main opposition parties consistently receive less than 25% of the electoral vote in executive and legislative elections, it may indicate that electoral competition is being restricted. However, there is no definitive electoral threshold. So long as these parties actively challenge the policies of the dominant party and face no significant institutional barriers to competing in the electoral arena, the polity is coded here.
• The electoral process must be largely free from exclusive, partisan-based political activism and coercion (recognizing that a “radical fringe” is likely to persist under most conditions, it will be marginal to group interest and support).
• The government must not use its institutional powers to interfere with, or unduly influence the outcome of, the electoral process.
• Small parties or political groups may be restricted and competition may still be coded here. So long as these small political parties are allowed to freely compete in electoral contests, reasonable “minimum vote” thresholds for representation in the national legislature will not disqualify a polity from being coded here.

No major social group or groups are routinely excluded from the political process.
• All domestic groups must have equal institutional opportunities to access the political process (although certain groups may dominate the political agenda).
• Group claims for self-determination or autonomy do not have to be satisfied to be coded here. However, if the central government resorts to repression to quell these demands and/or the focal group resorts to force in pursuit of their claims, the polity is not coded here (coded, rather, as Concept 6, 7, 8 or 9).

Major political parties are durable and have mass-based national constituencies.
• If numerous political parties – more than 10 – regularly contest national elections, it may be a sign that political competition has not been institutionalized. However, this is not a definitive threshold. In addition to the sheer number of parties, it is also important to note
the durability of these parties. If the major parties are fluid and/or factional in nature, the polity is not coded here. However, if these parties are durable and are not prone to factionalism, the polity may be coded here.

- If the major political parties are largely personalistic in nature – that is, they revolve around dominant personalities rather than ideological platforms – it may be a sign that competition has not been institutionalized. Once again, this is a judgement call. If personalistic parties have evolved into ideology-based or issue-based organizations over time or a personalistic leader rises from within the ranks of an existing organization, the polity may be coded here.

**Major political parties are inclusive, rather than exclusive, in character.**

- If the major political parties are primarily sectarian in nature – that is, they revolve around exclusive ethnic, racial, religious, or regional social networks (to the exclusion of other social networks), the polity is not coded here. This kind of environment is more accurately coded as Concept 6, 7, 8 or 9 depending on the degree of party exclusiveness and the extensiveness of inter-group conflict in the polity.

- If the political environment is dominated by class-based parties that actively compete in the electoral process but the use of non-party class instruments (e.g., labor unions, police, paramilitary groups, etc.) to coerce and intimidate opposition class forces is regular, the polity is not coded here.

- If the major political parties are secular in nature and actively seek to limit the political activities of non-secular political parties/movements, this may indicate factional rather than competitive competition.

**Respect for human rights and civil liberties.**

- If the polity holds open and fair elections but nonetheless experiences substantial violations of civil liberties, it is unlikely to be coded here. The systematic violation of civil liberties is a form of restriction on participation and the suppression of dissent, despite the existence of widespread political rights. However, under certain special conditions a restriction of civil liberties may occur in any political system. If the restrictions are statutory and transient rather than capricious or concentrated against certain oppositional group members, the polity may be coded here.